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The purpose of this study is to conduct a descriptive case study analysis of the
Weed and Seed and Community Policing Programs (WSCPP) and it’s impact on the
black community in Chicago, Illinois. This study will attempt to analyze and examine
the impact that the Weed and Seed and Community Policing Programs that were
organized, coordinated, and ignited in 1991 by the Department ofJustice had in altering
the siocial, economic and political status of the black coimnunity ofChicago, Illinois.
This study will also examine the role of the various community activists and
organizations that were associated with developing links between law enforcement,
employment, social welfare and planning, education, and neighborhood policing. The
study will also examine the various youth gang prevention strategies of the Weed and
Seed and Community Policing Programs during the period from 1990-1999. This
method will be used in order to ascertain whether demographic variables education, race,
income, housing, family composition, recreation, and telecommunication services were
the ultimate factors contributing to the programs operation in selected communities in the
City ofChicago.
The development oftheWeed and Seed and Community Policing Program by the
United States Department ofJustice in 1991 allowed local, state and federal authorities to
link together law enforcement, economic development and social welfare programs in the
attempt to “weed out” criminal elements as a precondition to “seeding” local programs
with funding. Weed and Seed in realitywill use federal laws to solve urban problems,
violate the civil liberties ofminorities, scapegoat rather than help a lost generation of
urban youth, and move the United States closer to a police state, especially with regard to
mban “policy” targeting low-income, predominately Black communities.
Low-income communities are well aware ofhow urgently they need expanded
social programs and responsible police protection. Funding is needed for public health,
education, and income-supplementing programs, and for neighborhood and commvinity-
based social service agencies. Police protection from violent crime is needed, consistent
with ethical police behavior and constitutional safeguards. However, the Weed and Seed
program is, by its own definition, not just a program but a strategy-a right wing strategy
that subverts those legitimate community objectives. It exploits legitimate fear ofcrime
in urban areas in order to position the Department of Justice as the central political force
determining urban policy in the United States, with many social agencies subordinated to
law-enforcement agencies. Its primary approach is not to solve complex urban problems
of racism and poverty, but rather, to suppress the symptoms ofurban neglect-drugs, crime
and violence-and in doing so suppress the youth of the inner city.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION AND STATEMENT OF RESEARCH PROBLEM
The following observation was made by Mack H. Jones in his effort to discuss the
relationship of social science inquiry as a reliable form of reference to study black politics
and community empowerment in the United States. According to Dr. Jones:
Every significant researchable problem occurs within a web of thought or
network growing out of a people’s anticipation and control needs. This web
includes, first of all a people’s worldview, which, among other things,
answers the question: Who are we? Where did we come firom? How did we
get here? Where do we wish to go? What alternative strategies have been
tried and what results were obtained and why? Who are our fiiends and
enemies? Closely connected with file world view of the second part of the
web, a set ofnormative assumptions which summarizes a people’s perception
of the nature of good life and the political, economic and cultural forms
necessary for its realization. Academic disciplines develop within the context
of these two.*
To understand the fullness ofDr. Mack H. Jones’ statement, one must assess how
the scientific method can be used to facilitate imderstanding of the various social,
economic and demographic problems that impact the quality ofblack life in the United
States. Such an examination will also yield historically, to how an abundance of
information on how violent crime, drug abuse, and gang activity has affected public
policy discissions on how to develop action strategies to address this dilemma. While
the scientific method is only one of several important phases in systematic inquiry, it is
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this crucial phase, which will facilitate the maximization of certainty in our efforts to deal
with these problems growing out of the black experience.^
Much of the scholarly literature which attempts to examine how comprehensive,
multi-agency strategies lead to the control and prevention ofviolent crime, drug
trafRcking, and drug-related crime has historically been theoretical in scope and based on
data ascertained from the United States Department of Justice, state, local, and private
sector initiative studies. Whenever such an endeavor is imdertaken at all, the law
enforcement researcher looks not to the experiences of communities involved in these
kinds of urban problems, but to the specific areas identified by law enforcement and the
media to be participating in drug related crimes.
The distinctive aim ofdeveloping a frame of reference or a conceptual model is to
advance systematic explanations in order to discover and formulate in general terms the
conditions under which social, and economic demographic conditions cause crime, drug
use and gang activity which has resulted in some of the worst drug and violent crimes
committed by narcotic traffickers and violent criminals that are often immediately
returned to the streets. Once they return they continue distributing drugs and terrorizing
local residents. This environment ofviolence makes potential witnesses fear for their
lives.
Several initiatives of the Office of Justice Programs are addressing crime and
violence through comprehensive, community-based efforts. These programs share goals
such as recognizing the importance of community involvement in grant development and
implementation. Another important aspect of these programs is the attempt to maximize
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the impact of existing resources through integrating national, state, and local resources of
both the public and private sectors.
One of the longest-running community-based programs is Operation Weed and
Seed. Initiated in 1991, Weed and Seed has received broad-based, bipartisan support
since its inception. The Executive Office for Weed and Seed works closely with the
Bureau of Justice Assistance to implement Operation Weed and Seed.
The Weed and Seed Strategy consists of four elements:
1. Coordinated Law Enforcement to “weed” crime, drug and gang activity;
2. Community Oriented Policing to serve as a bridge between the “weeding” (law
enforcement) and “seeding” efforts (crime prevention and neighborhood restoration);
3. Prevention, Intervention, and Treatment to increase the availability and coordination
ofhuman services such as crime prevention programs, educational opportunities, drug
treatment, family services, and recreational activities for youth;
4. Neighborhood restoration to revitalize distressed neighborhoods and improve the
quality of life for Weed and Seed residents through economic development, job
opportunities, improved housing conditions, and increased access to affordable
housing.^
The Weed and Seed initiative links federal, state, local law enforcement and
criminal justice efforts with social services, as well as with private and community
efforts. All Weed and Seed sites are required to provide a Safe Haven for the community,
or a place where children and adults can come together in supervised programs after
school and on weekends. Many of these Safe Havens are located in local school
buildings. All Weed and Seed sites also must demonstrate their capacity to obtain
resources from both the public and private sector.
Successful public partnerships have been made between the public and private
sector. Seven Weed and Seed sites participate in AmeriCorps, a joint venture between
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the Justice Department and the Cooperation for National Service, and five Weed and
Seed sites receive funding for participation in the National Performance Review.
Moreover, the U.S. Department ofHousing and Urban Development has requested its
most troubled communities to combine the Weed and Seed strategy with its hope VI
urban revitalization initiative.
There are several communities which receive grant funding to implement the
comprehensive Weed and Seed strategy. For example, in Chicago, Englewood,
Marquette, Austin, Morgan Park, and Rogers Park have all been receiving funds since the
programs formation. Over 40 additional communities are implementing the strategy
without grant funding. Before applying for funding, communities must have
implemented the Weed and Seed strategy without Justice Department funding and
received or applied for Official Recognition status. The Official Recognition designation
makes sites eligible to compete for future Weed and Seed funds, gives them preference
for selected federal discretionary resources, and gives them priority for federally
sponsored training and technical assistance. Part of the Department funding for Weed
and Seed comes from the Justice Department’s assets Forfeiture Funds derived from cash
assets seized during drug investigations. Several federal agencies have given preference
in their discretionary grant programs. Officially Recognized Weed and Seed
coiimnmities are encouraging state block grant agencies to provide assistance to these
sites as well. In addition, all Weed and Seed sites, funded and unfunded, are eligible for a
wide range of training and technical assistance services.
During the fiscal year 1997, the Weed and Seed Program became the Department’s
premier commimity-based public safety program. The Weed and Seed program expanded
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to 29 new sites in FY 1997, including Baltimore, Houston, and two Los Angles
neighborhoods. Together with 84 sites already funded, 113 communities are now
receiving a total of $26.2 million inWeed and Seed funding, the largest number of
funded sites in the program’s six-year history.'* A national conference sponsored by the
Executive Office forWeed and Seed brought together 750 participants in St. Louis in
August 1997 to share information about local innovations and ideas and strategies for
improving their neighborhoods. The conference spotlighted Weed and seed sites such as
San Jose, California, where gang-related incidents in the targeted neighborhood decreased
by 18 percent in the last six months of 1996 compared to the same period in 1995.
In FY 1998, the Weed and Seed program will continue to pursue activities that
provide guidance and support (in dollars and training/technical assistance) to
communities aroimd the nation to assist them to implement the Weed and Seed strategy.^
In 1998, about two dozen sites are expected to submit strategies to the Department of
Justice for Official Recognition. While appropriated funds have increased to $33.5
million, funding levels per site in 1998 are anticipated to be generally the same as FY
1997, given the increase in the number of sites and the anticipated retention of the $9
million cap on Asset Forfeiture Funds.® Sites whose performance indicates that they
would make good use of additional funds will be offered supplemental funds for special
projects and/or expansion to additional sites within the city. Additional funds will also be
offered to sites with high priority law enforcement needs. Funding several sites through a
single grant to a regional or state entity will be explored. The final number of funded
Weed and Seed sites is estimated to be 140.
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Part VI of the Criminal Justice Act of 1988 and the Drug Trafficking Act of 1994
have provided the black electorate with the opportunity to work along with officers on
foot patrols to reduce drug use, trafficking, and related crime in their community. For
example, the DOJ worked with the U.S. Attorney General in Oklahoma City, Oklahoma
to develop a safe haven strategy that focused on eliminating and identifying those
neighborhoods with numerous distress criteria (i.e. poverty, drug trafficking, gang
activity, and high rates ofunemployment). Since its development, the strategy has
produced a number of results. In 1997, the Chicago city council issued a summary of the
milestones achieved. The report indicated that these successes included:
• Placement of additional police in target area;
• Successfiil arrest and prosecution of the worst drug and violent gang offenders;
• Substantial reduction of open air drug markets;
• Increase in resident’s perception of safety;
• Establishment of the Safe Haven and the beginnings of a “one-stop” approach for
maternal and infant primary health care, social, educational and recreational services;
• Establishment of teen pregnancy prevention programs;
• The availability of the Housing Rehabilitation and Ownership Program to the target
area residents.’
While a number of studies have been written that describe how both black and white
public officials have developed action strategies to address the widening gap between
urban job opportunity structures and skill levels of disadvantaged residents, there is very
little information written that focuses on whether these strategies improved the spatial
isolation of low-income minorities and the rising levels of urban poverty and welfare
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dependency. Associated with these problems have been a plethora of social and
institutional ills which further aggravate the predicament ofpeople and places in distress,
such as high crimes, poor public schools, deteriorating public infrastructures, and the
decay ofonce vibrant residential and commercial areas of the cities. This may be because
ofpublic attention given to how these anti-crime strategies have removed the symptoms
of the problem and failed to address the root of the problem. This study is written to fill
this void in the hope that it can stimulate further research on this subject matter.
For this empirical investigation, the writer has chosen the City ofChicago to
conduct the research investigation. The City ofChicago was chosen because of the
history and development of the Weed and Seed and Community Policing programs in
these states.
The purpose of this study is to explore the extent to which differences in urban anti¬
crime and drug trafficking strategies do, in fact, influence the role that law enforcement
plays in coordinating programs to slow the tide of crime and violence caused by drug
abuse and gang activity. After a review of the literature, the following research questions
will be examined.
HYPOTHESIS
1. Are Community Policing and Weed and Seed Programs more likely to be a part of the
Office of Justice Programs if crime, juvenile delinquency, drug abuse, and gang
activity continue to affect black community residents and their neighborhoods?
2. Are Community Policing and anti-loitering programs more likely to be a part of the
Weed and Seed program ifproblems affecting residents and their neighborhoods
continue to exist?
8
3. Will Community Policing and Weed and Seed programs continue to operate
exclusively inminority communities as long as law enforcement, business, schools,
and conununity residents see a need?
4. What factors are related to crime prevention and crime reduction in minority
communities?
METHODOLOGY
This paper is a case study ofOperationWeed and Seed and Community Policing
Programs, and how the program and services offered had an impact on the black
community in Chicago, Illinois. The hypothesis for this study will be tested on data
collected in the City ofChicago in 1998. The study will also use data compiled by the
Center for Urban Affairs and Policy Research at Northwestern University, the
information superhighway (e.g. Internet), and retrieving public documents via the
Federal, state and local community policing programs. The study will also use data
collected in the field, in addition to a content analysis of a variety of secondary books and
journals, and articles that assessed the public health consequences and policy issues
associated with youth gang activities in Chicago, Illinois. For the purpose of this study, a
random sample of residents from low to moderate socioeconomic groups, stratified by
race, age, income, education and housing location patterns was conducted. The sample
size was selected and two sets of telephone surveys were administered in order to gather
information from an estimated 900 residents, 180 per district in order to identify the top
18 issues they believed the WSCPP should address. Moreover, those community
residents living in the Weed and Seed target area were also asked their perceptions of the
different crime problems, as well as police service in their neighborhood. Using public
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documents produced by the U.S. Department of Justice and the U.S. Census Bureauwill
also collect data.
INDEPENDENT AND DEPENDANT VARIABLES
The independent variables used for this topic will be Weed and Seed and
Community Policing programs implemented in the states previously mentioned. The
dependent variable will be the crime level in the communities being directly affected by
these programs.
DEFINITION OF MAJOR CONCEPTS
Operation Weed and Seed - is a neighborhood-based, multi-agency approach to law
enforcement and community revitalization in high-crime areas. The program’s goal is to
improve the quality of life in targeted neighborhoods by controlling and preventing
crime, drug abuse, and gang activity. The Weed and Seed strategy integrates federal,
state, and local law enforcement and criminal justice resources with corresponding hiraian
services and private and community resources to maximize program impact. Resident
participation is an essential element ofWeed and Seed programs.
Community Policing - is a collaborative effort between the police and the community
that identifies problems of crime and disorder and involves all elements of the community
in the search for solutions to these problems. It is founded on close, mutually beneficial
ties between police and community members.
Loitering — is to remain in any one place with no apparent purpose.
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PROCEDURE OF INQUIRY
The research study is organized into five chapters. Chapter I will attempt to
develop an introduction to assess the evolution and development of the weed and seed
and Community Policing Program. Chapter II focuses on the relevant literature in the
field relating to the research topic. Chapter III will attempt to will examine the various
youth gang prevention strategies implemented by the WSCPP to address juvenile
violence and crime. The chapter will also give specific reference to the City ofChicago
and the Gang Congregation Ordinance, Chicago’s Alternative Policing Strategy, and end
with success stories of this particular strategy. Chapter IV will discuss the racial
implications of Operation Weed and Seed, more specifically with the criminalization of
black youth, the federalization of law enforcement, and the strategy to co-opt community
leadership. Chapter V as a conclusion will assess arguments presented in the research in
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CHAPTER II
REVIEW OF LITERATURE
There is literature that supports the fact that there is a definite problem with
juvenile delinquency in the United States. Many have critiqued the Department of
Justice, Juvenile Courts, as well as other state and local officials on the manner in which
they have dealt with this problem. The following literature review will discuss the issues,
causes and prevention of these juvenile problems as proposed by many scholars,
politicians, juvenile courts, and government agencies. It will also cover previous models
that have been implemented in other cities in the United States.
Robert C. Trojanowicz introduced one of the earliest models of community
policing in the early 80’s. He has written a number ofpieces on the subject matter, and
was instrumental in starting the Flint Michigan Neighborhood Policing Program. In
initially researching this concept, some interesting concepts were discovered about police
officers and residents in each community. According to the research of the Bureau of
Justice Statistics, less than 10% ofpatrol officer’s on-duty time is spent on crime related
activities.' This includes answering crime calls, conducting investigations, writing
reports, booking arrestees, and testifying in court. The remainder of the time is spent on
handling service calls, traffic enforcement and control, information gathering, and
uncommitted patrol time. The implications of this data are that traditional patrol
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operations are ineffective and perhaps misdirected. That is, there is a significant amount
ofwasted patrol time organized for crime control duties, which are not forthcoming.
Importantly, even in the nation’s largest police departments and in the busiest patrol
districts, the imcommitted patrol time is less, but the proportion of time spent on crime-
related duty remains about the same.
Dr. Trojanowicz also found that the perceptions ofcommunity policing differed
between blacks and whites. Research shows that the majority of racial minorities felt
victimized by the police, and perceived the police more negatively that did whites. The
community policing program in Flint, Michigan improved police/commimity relations
and reduced the disparity in perceptions ofpolice performance between blacks and
whites. In the national crime surveys of 1975,47% ofwhites rated police performance as
good; only 24% of the blacks gave police the same rating, for a difference of 23%
between the two groups.^ There was a 10% difference between the two groups in the
poor performance rating with blacks being more negative. When Flint residents were
used as the sample, the range ofdifference between the two groups in 1979 was from
13.2 percent to 20.2 percent, again with blacks more negative.^
The Flint, Michigan Neighborhood Foot Patrol Program, from the outset, faced a
difficult implementation problem, for it sought to redefine the role of the police officer in
a working setting where the officer responded to multiple and potentially conflicting
audiences, and was even less likely to be directly observed by the supervisor than the
traditional patrol officer. In a radical departure from both preventative patrol and
traditional foot patrol models, Flint’s Neighborhood Foot Patrol Program based officers
so they would be accessible to all types socioeconomic neighborhoods, locating their
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officers in such places as community centers and public schools. “The officers were to
go beyond organizing neighborhood watches and were to serve as catalysts in the
formation ofneighborhood associations which articulated community expectations of the
police and established foot patrol priorities and community programs.”^ The officers
were expected to work in partnershipwith community organizations and individual
citizens to deliver a comprehensive set of services through referrals, interventions and
links to governmental social agencies. This concept also served as the catalyst for the
formation ofOperation Weed and Seed.
In Dallas, Texas, Operation Weed and Seed has been in place for a little over two
years. And though still in the early stages, the program has not imdergone a formal
evaluation, several advantages ofapplying Wed and Seed principles are already
emerging. They include “officers having a clearer sense ofmission and feeling more a
part of the community, the ability to better measure the performance of its officers,
increased citizen participation, and achievement of the goal ofneighborhood self-
sufficiency is within reach for target areas.”*
The Tallahassee Police Department had the following statement to say about
Operation Weed and Seed. The statement was as follows;
Tallahassee, Florida became a Weed and Seed funded site in 1996. The
target area is the Springfield Apartment Complex located in the northwest
quadrant of Tallahassee. The population is around 6,000 people, 60% are
black and 38% are white. Over 50% of its residents are under the age of 24,
and 50% of the residents live below the poverty level. The police department
has had a Community Oriented Policing program in the area since 1994 that
has helped decrease the rate of serious crime by 18%. The law enforcement
agencies have also studied and began implementing the use of Crime
Prevention Through Environmental Design (CPTED) in the Springfield
complex. Another Weed and Seed project is the Public Housing
Management Assessment Program. This program provides a screening
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process for applicants to the public housing and has led to arrest of applicants
on outstanding warrants. This has been a very successful program.
“On October 16,1995, California Govoner Pete Wilson signed into law a
‘loitering’ bill that makes it possible for police to arrest someone they suspect in
engaging in drug dealing or prostitution.”* The law makes it a misdemeanor to loiter in a
public place under conditions that police believe constitute “requisite intent” to engage in
a drug or prostitution offense. A similar bill was passed not long after in Chicago,
Illinois.
Jerome Miller in his research on African American males in the criminal justice
system found the following to be true. He states that “by the early 1990s, an absolute
majority ofyoung minority males were being arrested -most for minor crimes and
misdemeanors. In addition to the approximately three million arrests for violent crimes,
there were 11 million arrests for lesser crimes and misdemeanors. Grossly
disproportionate percentages of the arrestees were young Afncan American men.”^
In 1995, the U.S. Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention released
a national report on juvenile offenders and victims. The report states that “after more
than a decade of relative stability, the juvenile violent crime arrest rate soared between
1988 and 1992, and if the current trend continues as it has over the past ten years,
juvenile crime arrest will double by the year 2010.”* In 1997, the agency released an
update on the same topic. This latest report in the series provides the reader with
“convincing information that the wave of violence by juveniles that the United States has
experienced in the last ten years may be subsiding. The most recent victimization data,
for example, finds that serious violent crimes by juveniles dropped 25% between 1994
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and 1095. The most recent FBI data also reports substantial declines in juvenile arrests
for violent crimes. Most encouraging is the nearly 20% decline in murders by juveniles
between 1993 and 1995.”’
Senate bill S. 10 has been one way the government has chosen to deal with the
problems ofjuveniles. Lisa Weintraub and Russ Tisinger released information on this
* * ■
bill in a recent issue ofCongressional Quarterly. The statement reads that “Senate bill S.
10 calls for youth offenders of violent federal crimes to be tried in adult court. It would
make it easier for law enforcement officials to get access to the criminal records of
minors, which are now generally sealed and often expunged when a person turns 18. The
Senate measure includes a section that would expand the federal government’s role in
gang prosecution. The Senate bill also includes $100 million specifically allocated to the
Boys and Girls Club ofAmerica and orders the Justice Department to use the money to
help create another 1,000 local clubs, bringing the total to 2,500.”'°
As juvenile crime increased in recent years, a number of opinion polls were taken
to ascertain the public view of issues concerning juvenile crime and justice, including
whether the death penalty is an appropriate punishment for juvenile offenders. “ANew
York Times/CBS Poll in 1996 included a series of questions about “juvenile crime” and
“teenage violence,” 84% said they thought juvenile crime had increased and 81% said
teenage violence was a “big problem” in their community. When asked about these
problems in their own communities, however, “58% thought juvenile crime had
increased, and 33% thought teenage violence was a big problem.”"
Robert Agnew in his research on the origins of delinquent events examined the
explanations delinquents offered for engaging in 14 different types of offenses. Property
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crimes are committed primarily for self-gratification/pleasure and utilitarian need.
Violent crimes are committed primarily for retaliation/revenge. Drug offenses are
committed primarily because of social pressure, with self-gratification/pleasure also an
important reason. With isolated exceptions, these findings hold for less and more serious
crimes and across a variety of subgroups.”’^
Jennifer Friday has done research on children in underserved communities, and
studied how violence in their community has affected their lives. The research has shown
that “There is striking evidence that violence has a psychological impact on children and
yoimg adults in the United States, particularly those in underserved communities.
Homicide is the second leading cause ofdeath ofall person’s ages of 15 and 25 years and
is the leading cause among African American youth. In 1990, more young African
American men died from homicides than from all natural causes combined. Research
indicates a number of factors that can predispose children to a lifetime of violence and
criminal activity, including poverty, substance abuse, poor parenting skills, placement
outside of the home, and improper peer interaction.”’^
In research done by JeffGrogger and the National Bureau ofEconomic Research,
Grogger has found a correlation between market wages and youth crime. He states that
“young men’s behavior appears to be very responsive to price incentives. My estimates
suggest that falling real wages may have been an important determinant of rising youth
crime over the past two decades. Moreover, wages explain an important component of
the racial differential in criminal participation, and they largely explain the age
?5l4distribution of crime.
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Mentoring has been one method in dealing with juvenile delinquency. Jean
Grossman and Eileen Garry write about a mentoring program named JUMP. It states that
“the Juvenile Mentoring program (JUMP) is a Federal program administered by the
Office ofJuvenile justice and Delinquency Prevention (OJJDP). JUMP is designed to
form a number ofcommunity mentoring programs in an effort to reduce juvenile
delinquency and gang participation, improve academic performance, and reduce school
dropout rates.””
Florida is another state affected by the Weed and Seed program. David
Rasmussen and Yiwen Yu ofFlorida State University conducted an evaluation of
juvenile justice innovations in Florida. Their evaluation states that “to the extent that this
program deters or rehabilitates youthfiil offenders, the benefits reported here are
understated: Over 7,200 robberies, burglaries, and motor vehicle thefts have been
prevented by incarcerating habitual offenders during the 1992-1995 study period. Since
some violent crimes were also averted, this is a conservative estimate of the program’s
impact on public safety; A conservative estimate of the gross public benefit of this reduce
level of property crime is valued at about $6 million year or $21,000 per offender; The
program for At-Risk-Students may have averted as many as 1,500 property crimes.””
Government funding plays a big part in this prevention process. The U.S. Office
of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention issued a statement on Title V incentive
grants. It states that “in 1996, the Office ofjuvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention
distributed another $20 million to the States to support the Community Prevention Grants
program at the local level. This brings the total to more that $50 million over the past
three years that has been distributed on a formula basis to 49 States, five Territories, and
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the District ofColumbia to award to units ofgeneral local government for delinquency
prevention activities. OJJDP also has continued to provide training in how to plan and
implement effective, commimity-specific, risk-and protection-focused prevention
strategies.”'’
The OJJDP will also award continuation grants of up to $200,000 to each of four
competitively selected communities that initially received funds in FY 1997. The funds
will help to increase the effectiveness of current youth gim violence reduction strategies
by enhancing and coordinating prevention, intervention, and suppression strategies and
strengthening linkages between community residents, law enforcement, and the juvenile
justice system. Baton Rouge, Louisiana; Oakland, California; Shrevport, Louisiana; and
Syracuse, New York were competitively selected to receive 3-year awards.'*
In 1991, juvenile courts in the United States processed 1,338,100 delinquency
cases (cases in which a juvenile was charged with an act that would be a criminal law
violation for adults). Juvenile courts handled 5% more delinquency cases in 1991 than in
1990 and 16% more than 1987. The largest increase over the five-year period was in
violent crime cases, an increase of 54%. The high volume violent offense cases of
robbery and aggravated assault increased by 35% and 69% respectively. In contrast, over
this five-year period the number ofproperty offense cases increased by 16%, while drug
law violation cases declined by 19%.'®
Juvenile courts in the United States processed an estimated 1.7 million
delinquency cases in 1995. Delinquency cases involve juveniles charged with criminal
law violations. The number of delinquency cases handled by juvenile courts increased 45
20
between 1986 and 1995. Since 1986, cases involving offenses against persons 98%,
property offense cases increased 23%, and drug law violation cases increased 120%.“
Racial disproportion in the juvenile courts has been an issue for a number ofyears
now. Edmrmd F. McGarrell has found this disparity to be true. “This study examined
data on juvenile court processing ofWhite and non-white youths in a sample of 159
countries. The findings indicated that non-White youths were more likely to be referred
to and petitioned in court, to be detained, and to be placed outside of the home. Further,
the disparity between White and non-White youths increased from 1985 to 1989.”^'
In 1991, 80% of the juvenile population were white and 15% black. In
comparison, white juveniles were involved in 64% of all delinquency cases processed by
juvenile courts in 1991. Black juveniles were involved in 32% of delinquency cases.
Controlling for population differences, black juveniles were referred to juvenile courts at
more than double the rate ofwhite juveniles.^^
In 1991, white youth were involved in 56% ofperson offense cases, 69% of
property offense cases, and 50% of drug law violation cases. Black juveniles were more
likely to be detained than white juveniles were. In 1991,17% ofall delinquency cases
involving a white juvenile were detained, compared to 26% of cases involving a black
juvenile. This pattern held across offense categories. The disparity was largest in drug
law violation cases, with detentions occurring in 25% of cases involving white juveniles
and 48% of cases involving black juveniles.^
In 1995, approximately 80% of the juvenile population in the United Sates was
white and 15% were black. Black juveniles, however, were involved in 34% of the
delinquency cases handled by the U.S. juvenile courts. White juveniles were involved in
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63% of all cases, and youth ofother races accounted for 4%. Black juveniles were
involved in 38% ofperson offense cases, 26% ofproperty offenses, and 34% of drug law
violation cases.
During 1995, U.S. attorneys filed cases against 240 persons for alleged acts of
juvenile delinquency. “Of these, 122 cases were adjudicated in Federal court,
representing 0.2% of the 56,243 cases (both adult and juvenile) adjudicated during 1995.
Almost halfofjuvenile delinquency cases involved a violent offense (32%) or a drug
offense (15%). Federal prosecutors declined further action against 228 other juveniles
referred to them. Many of the juveniles adjudicated in the Federal system are Native
Americans.”^*
The proportion ofmales in private facilities increased from 71.3% to 73.5%
between 1991 and 1995. The number ofmales held increased 13% in this period from
25,801 to 29,176. While the number ofwhite, non-Hispanic juveniles is largely the same
in 1991 and 1995, the number ofminority youth has increased. From 1991 to 1995, the
number ofwhite youth increased 2.6%. However, the number of black youth increased
15% and the number ofHispanic youth increased 31%. Youth of other races (including
Asian, Native American, and Pacific Islander) increased 29.5%. The growth in the
number ofminority youth was greater than the 11% growth in the overall population.^®
The literature clearly indicates many of the problems ofjuvenile delinquency in
the United States. The statistics have shown that the problems are increasing, and a
definite plan ofaction must be implemented to cure this social ill. The literature also
shows some of the innovations many states have made, as well as politicians, with each
having a certain amount of success. Finally, we see the amoimt ofmoney being spent
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yearly to fund each state or cities program. An evaluation of these programs,
innovations, and spending will come in the following chapters.
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CHAPTER III
HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OFWEED AND SEED STRATEGIES IN
CHICAGO. ILLINOIS
HISTORY OF CHICAGO. ILLINOIS
Illinois, also known as the Prairie State, first became a political unit when it was
made a district of the French province ofLouisiana in 1717. Illinois, along with the rest
ofFrance’s territory east of the Mississippi, was turned over to Great Britain in 1763. In
the 1770’s the settlement that later became Chicago was foxmded by Jean Baptist Point du
Sable, a West Indian trapper ofFrench and African parentage. The only other community
developed at that time was established in 1803 near the site of the Lake Michigan trading
post. From 1800 to 1809 Illinois was included in the Indiana Territory. It became a
separate territory in 1809 and in 1818 was admitted to the Union as the 21®* state.
Chicago is the largest city in Illinois and the third largest city in the nation with
2,783,726 residents. A center of industry, commerce, and finance, the metropolis that lies
at the tip of Lake Michigan is perhaps most famous as a transportation center. It is
known as the railroad, airline, and trucking hub ofNorth America. It is linked by





Source; Chicago Police Department
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that serves foreign and domestic ships. Chicago is also famous for its huge meat-packing
industry.
In state and local politics voters usually favor Republican candidates. The
founding for the now-traditional Democratic organization in Chicago was laid during the
brief term ofAnton Cermak in 1933. The party organization was consolidated diuing the
six administrations ofRichard J. Daley. The city elected its first black mayor, Harold
Washington, in 1983. The first three black members of the United States Congress in this
century all represented Chicago.
Illinois is now served by a network of state and federal highways. The heaviest
concentration of roads is in the Chicago area. In 1953 the State Toll Highway Authority
was established. It maintains and operates the more than 276-niile (444 kilometer)
Illinois Tollway System, whichmainly serves Chicago and northern Illinois. Chicago is
also a major ayiation center, operating Chicago-O’Hare International Airport, which is
usually ranked as the busiest airport in the United States.
A DEMOGRAPfflC PROFILE OF CfflCAGO. ILLINOIS
Whenever doing research in a specific geographical area, it is imperative that one
knows the demographic profile ofthe people living there. This type ofdata was retrieved
on the City ofChicago from data compiled in the 1990 U.S. Census. The following
tables will give a profile on the people of Chicago according to race, sex, educational
attainment, poverty and housing.
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According to the 1990 census, there were 2,1 126 people living in Chicago. Of
that number, 1,332,653 were male, and 1,451, 073 were female. In regards to race, the







Asian or Pacific Islander 104,141
Other Race 320,482
Source: 1990 United States Census
Another important factor when researching the demographics of a city is the educational
attainment of the people in that area. The following table shows the educational
attainment of those age eighteen and older living in Chicago.
TABLE!
Citv ofChicago: Educational Attainment fl8 vears and olderi
Educational Attainment Total
Less that O* grade 284,475
9* to 12*, no diploma 407,480
High School graduate (includes equivalency) 512,969
Some college, no degree 388,369
Associate’s degree 93,477
Bachelor’s degree 240,558
Graduate or professional degree 132,916
Source: 1990 United States Census
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The next table will give the poverty status of those living in Chicago according to race.
The first table will show those living above the poverty level, and the next will show
those living below the poverty level.
TABLE3





Asian ofPacific Islander 84,352
Other race 236,382
Source: 1990 United States Census
TABLE 4





Asian or Pacific Islander 17,759
Other race 81,765
Source: 1990 United States Census
Finally, in regards to housing, knowing the number of those who rent houses or
apartments as opposed to home ownership is an important factor when analyzing how
policy affects people. Table 5 will show the nmnber ofpeople who are renters in
Chicago by race. Table 6 will show the number ofhouseholds which are home owners in
Chicago, again by race.
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Table 5





Asian or Pacific Islander
Other race
Source: 1990 United States Census
TABLE 6




Asian or Pacific Islander 5,159
Other race 8,892






PEOPLE AND THE FOLKS
Chicago, Illinois suffers from the same persistent crime and disorder problems
one would expect in the third largest city in the country. In recent years, street gangs
have rapidly migrated to numerous rural and suburban communities throughout Illinois.
Since the early 80’s, the State of Illinois has had to deal with two major gangs, known as
“People” and “Folks.” There is an obvious and distinctive difference that separates youth
groups from gangs. Illinois State Police define “street gang” or “gang” as any
combination, alliance, conspiracy or understanding, of three or more persons with an




Source: Illinois Police Department
CHARTS
FOLKS: Gang Signs
Source: Illinois Police Department
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criminal activity. Drug distribution, assaults and weapons related offenses are typically
associated with street gangs.
The two major alliances in Chicago, “People” and “Folks,” were established in the
1980’s, in the penitentiary system. The alliances are not aligned along traditional
racial boundaries and both contain black, white, Hispanic street gangs. Both alliances are
alive and well on Chicago’s streets and in most cases are bitter rivals.
The “People” gangs all wear their identifiers to the left side. An earring in the left
ear, a left pant leg rolled up, the strap of a pair of overalls dangling to the left side, a cap
tilted to the left; all may indicate gang affiliation to this alliance. The gang hand sign is
thrown toward the left shoulder. Their gang members fold their arms in a manner that
will point to their left side. The “Folks” gangs, on the other hand, all wear their
identifiers to the right side.
The “People” alliance inmost instances utilizes the five-pointed star in their gang
graffiti. The five pointed star has its origin with the Black Stone Ranger/Black P Stone
Nation, one of the larger black street gangs. The alliance’s term “high five, six must die”
is a reference to their five-pointed star versus the six-pointed star of the “Folks” alliance.
Commonly used by the “People” alliance are drawings ofpitchforks pointing down
which shows disrespect to the rival “Folks” alliance.
The six-pointed Star ofDavid, a Jewish religious symbol in the honor ofKing
David, is used by the “Folks” alliance in the graffiti. When the leader and founder of the
Black Gangster Disciple Nation, David Barksdale was slain, the gang adopted the symbol
in his honor. The many gangs who aligned with this gang, under the “Folks” alliance.
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adopted this symbol for their graffiti and hand signs. Variations of the symbol with and
without pitchforks running through it n an upward fashion represents the “Folks” alliance.
Although the “People” and “Folks” alliances are very strong groups and are bitter
enemies, there are rivalries within the alliances themselves. For example, 24 “Folks”
gangs or factions have been identified in the Chicago area. Factions have been involved
in battles over turf or narcotics territory faction. A “People gang faction will normally
not align themselves with a “Folks” gang faction for support. There have been
exceptions to this rule to facilitate narcotics trafficking.
THE CITY OF CfflCAGO AND THE GANG CONGREGATION ORDINANCE
Community Policing in Chicago has also put pressure on city officials to make
more innovative strides at controlling gang violence and activity. Concerned about an
increase in street crime, the City ofChicago conducted hearings about gang-related crime
in 1992. As a result of the hearings, the city coimcil enacted the Gang Congregation
Ordinance, more commonly known as the “gang loitering ordinance.” The gang
loitering ordinance consist of the following criteria:
1. “Whenever a police officer observes a person whom he reasonably believes to be a
criminal street gang member loitering in any place with one or more others persons,
he shall order all such persons to disperse and remove themselves from the area. Any
person who does not promptly obey such an order is in violation of this section.
2. It shall be an affirmative defense to an alleged violation of this section that no person
who was observed loitering was in fact a member of a criminal street gang.
3. ‘Loiter’ means to remain in any one place with no apparent purpose.
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4. ‘Criminal street gang’ means any ongoing organization, association, in fact or group
of three or more persons, whether formal or informal, having as one of its substantial
activities the commission ofone or more of the criminal acts enumerated, and whose
members individually or collectively engage in or have engaged in a pattern of
criminal gang activity.
5, ‘Public place’ means the public way and any other location open to the public,
whether publicly or privately owned.”
Each violation of the ordinance is punishable by a fine ofup to $500, imprisonment for
not more than six months, and requirement to perform up to 120 hours of community
service.
From 1993 to 1995, Chicago police hauled in more than 43,000 suspected gang
members under the “gang loitering” ordinance. Fewer than 1% of those arrested were
ever prosecuted, and more than 70 defendants convicted under the ordinance appealed to
the U.S. Supreme Court. But the police. City Council members, and many neighbors say
the unusual law helped clean up even the meanest ofcity streets. Despite what many
perceived as success, the ordinance still faced strong opposition. When the City Council
adopted the ordinance, 11 aldermen, all of them black or Hispanic, voted against it. And
while Rep. Luis Gutierrez, D-Ill., supports the law. Rep. Jesse Jackson Jr., D-Ill., has
joined the NAACP, American Civil Liberties Union, and the National Council of La Raza
in opposing the ordinance. “It’s an anti-ffeedom-of-assembly law that has been applied
mostly against young people of color,” says Warren Friedman of the Chicago Alliance for
Neighborhood Safety.
36
But three years ago, the law was struck down in state court as “vague and
arbitrary.” And now, in amajor clash between individual rights and community interest,
the Supreme Courtwill consider v^ether the Chicago law is constitutional.
The case that will be heard is Chicago v. Morales, and a ruling is likely to handed
down sometime in 1999. Jesus Morales, 17, was arrested while hobbling home from the
hospital on crutches. Police stopped him because he was wearing blue and black, typical
gang colors in Chicago. The ACLU, who is representing Morales, says the law gives
police far too much discretion and violates cherished freedoms such as the right of
association and the freedom to move freely and to travel. The ACLU further states that
“the ordinance is unconstitutionally vague because it fails to provide adequate notice as to
what conduct is unlawful.” The ordinance also provides police with unfettered discretion
thatwill lead to arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement. The ordinance also violates
substantive due-process protections, because it impedes numerous personal liberties.
Though the issues were not addressed by the Illinois Supreme Court, the ordinance also
violates First Amendment assembly and association rights (See Chicago v. Morales in
Appendix 1).
The City’s argument is that the law is a necessary means of improving the quality
of life and preventing urban decline. The court should defer to the legislature, which
conducted extensive hearings on the subject of gang-related crime. Though the ordinance
grants police a wide range of discretion, the ordinance should be interpreted in
conjunction with a general police order, which saves the law from vagueness problems.
This case is important because itwill set the tone for other cities in the United
States facing similar problems. The ordinance has won the support from city, county, and
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State organizations, as well as the attorneys general or 31 states and the Justice
Department. Still the case represents a clash between individual rights and community
needs, i.e., quality-of-life measures aimed at stopping gang violence. Though the case
more directly involves due-process issues, the law implicates the First Amendment
became individuals can be punished for engaging in First Amendment activities,
CHICAGO’S ALTERNATIVE POLICING STRATEGY
In 1993, city leaders decided that community policing may be the way for the city
to control its problems with gangs, and by early accounts it seems to be working.
Chicago’s Alternative Policing Strategy (CAPS) reorganized police around small
geographical areas, where “beat teams” worked with the community members to solve
problems with an eye for the long term. To give officers the time to do this, the burden of
911 calls was shifted to rapid response teams and tactical units, and a wave ofnew
recruits was hired.
What makes CAPS innovative is that it brings the police, the community, and
other city agencies together to identify and solve neighborhood crime problems, rather
than simply react to their symptoms after the fact. Problem solving at the neighborhood
level is supported by a variety of strategies, including neighborhood-based beat officers,
regular Beat Community Meetings involving police and residents, extensive training for
both police and community, more efficient use ofCity services that impact crime, and
new technology to help police and residents target crime hot spots. With CAPS, police
officers continue to enforce the law and respond rapidly to serious crimes and life-
threatening emergencies. But CAPS recognizes that the police alone cannot solve the
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City’s crime problems. It takes a combined effort ofpolice, coimnunity, and City
government working together.
Implementation ofCAPS began in April 1993 with the five of the City’s 25 police
districts: Englewood (7*), Marquette (10*), Austin (15*), Morgan Park (22”'*), and Rogers
Park (24*). These prototype districts, in the view of the City ofChicago, are diverse in
terms of their demographics, economics, crime problems, and levels of community
organization. As such, they will hopefully provide a valuable laboratory for testing and
improving the CAPS model before it was expanded citywide. Implementation ofCAPS
in the other 20 police districts began in 1994, and the strategy is now operational in all of
Chicago’s neighborhoods. The five original prototype districts continue to serve as a
laboratory for testing new ideas and new technology.
According to Chicago Police and community residents, the CAPS program has
been a relative success. In all five-prototype districts, residents reported decreases in
The data was compiled by the Center for Urban Affairs and Policy Research at
Northwestern University. Findings were based on two sets of telephone surveys.
Approximately 900 residents, 180 per district, and were asked to rate 18 issues (potential
problems) in their district, identifying the top four. Residents were also asked their
perceptions ofdifferent crime problems, as well as police service in their neighborhood.
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In the category ofmajor crime problems, (robbery, burglary, sexual assault, and auto
theft) some districts declined more than others, but all reported declines (See Table 7).
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Source: Center for Urban Affairs and Policy Research at Northwestern University
In those districts with the largest drug and gang problems to begin with, residents
reported significant improvements. This was true in the 7* and 15* district, and to a
lesser extent in the 10* district. (See Table 8)
TABLES
Reduction in Drug and Gang Problems
District 1993 1994





Source: Center for Urban Affairs and Policy Research at Northwestern University
There was a marked increase in optimism about police service in each district.
Improvements were reported in police concern for the community, working with
residents, responsiveness to calls, and dealing with real problems. District 7 residents, for
example, reported large improvements in the ability of the police to keep order in the
streets and to treat people with fairness. (See Table 9)
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Source: Center for Urban Affairs and Policy Research at Northwestern University
Though each of these districts did show some change in crime and police perceptions, it
should be noted that such a small amount of change could come from an error in testing,
which would therefore make the percentages in this study less significant, if at all.
The City ofChicago’s police deparbnent and the community residents have
vowed to take back their communities one district at a time. The next few segments will
give personal statements from officers and residents of the five prototype districts stating
the relative success of the CAPS program.
Success Stories in District #7—Englewood
Beat 711 is one of the busiest in the city. The beat lies in the heart ofEnglewood
and is home to Englewood High School and a halfdozen churches. Drugs and poverty
are serious problems here. But that has not stopped residents and police officers from
forming a strong partnership. “At one time the residents were afraid to talk to the
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policemen, but now they actually do it,”' says William Lambert, a resident ofBeat 711.
Residents and police are talking, and they are beginning to find solutions to some very
tough problems.
So far, the biggest successes have involved diminished drug trafficking in two
notorious comers selected as priorities for the beat. The community identified the
^ « • •
problem locations at beat community meetings, and residents followed up by showing
police where the dealers were stashing their drugs. Targeted surveillance and
enforcement activity followed. “Narcotics arrests have gone fi'om being the least fi'equent
type of arrest on the beat to being the number one,”^ says Sergeant James Cole,
711’s beat team leader. Cole and others acknowledge that many problems remain on
Beat 711, but not as many as before. And police and community remain committed to
solving problems one at a time.
When the Chicago Alliance for Neighborhood Safety published a 1994 report that
painted a rather disturbing picture ofpolice-youth relations in Chicago, police and
community leaders in the Englewood neighborhood decided to tackle the issue head on.
InMarch 1995, the CAPS Youth and Family Subcommittee sponsored the district’s first
Police-Student Forum at Kennedy BCing College, as a first step toward opening lines of
communication between the two groups. Ten police officers from the 7“’ district and 32
students form Englewood, Harper, Lindblom, and Robeson High Schools attended the
forum, which was moderated by YusufHasan, Youth Prevention Coordinator for the
Department of Human Services. Commander Ronald Evans requested that each school
not send its honor students, but instead send average students and those who have had
brushes with the law. Topics of discussion included gangs, drugs, and family violence.
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Follow-up sessions were held in April and May, and police plan to resume the program in
September. “Before, I used to think that the police were bad guys,” Tony Henderson, a
16-year -old Harper High School sophomore who took part in the program, told the Daily
Southtown newspaper. “But now I know they are out to help you, not hurt you.”^
To improve lines ofcommunicationwith the community, the 7* District’s
Neighborhood Relations Office recently set up a complaint line and began advertising it
at beat meetings. So when a concerned resident called about drug dealing and loitering
on the 7100 block of South Perry Avenue, police were ready to respond.
Neighborhood Relations passed the information to the Tactical Unit, which
assigned the complaint to two tactical teams: Officers Ronald Condreva and E.J. May,
and Officers James O’Donnell and Richard Ferenzi. The tactical teams set up
surveillance. When they observed the dealer removing crack cocaine from a comer fence
post and making sales to several people who were congregating at the location, officers
placed him under arrest. Since the arrest, loitering on the block has stopped, and
Neighborhood Relations have received no new narcotics complaints.
Englewood Hospital, abandoned since 1988, was more than an eyesore to the
community; it was a health and crime hazard as well. Drug dealers and prostitutes found
the huge sixty-story building an idea location for conducting illicit business. Needles and
other dmg debris littered the grounds, creating serious risks for the student at nearby
Nicholson Graimnar School.
For next-door neighbor Cora Taylor, the old building was a stmctural threat to her
home. The hospital butted against her building, and during heavy rainstorms, water
would pour out of the unsound stmcture and dam up against her walls. She took her case
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to Building Court, but the hospital’s ownership was tangled up in competing claims.
Finally, Ms. Taylor and the other neighbors took their problem to a CAPS meeting, and
got results.
Commimity organizer Jamesetta Harris explains, “We took petitions, pictures, and
students fromNicholson School, rented a bus, and went to demolition court, and the rest
is history.” On February 28, the wrecking ball moved in, and the hospital came down.
Mayor Daley, on hand for the demolition, credited CAPS for the success. Thanking 7*
District Commander Ron Evans and the Englewood neighbors, the Mayor said, “They did
an outstanding job and were persistent about going to court. These residents have shown
that community policing really works.”"*
Success Stories in District #10—Marquette
Thanks to the efforts ofpolice and school officials, Farragut High School has
gone from being one of the City’s most violent schools to one of its safest. Mob fights at
the racially diverse school dropped from 300 in the 1992-93 school year to 18 last year,
while classroom attendance has risen from 70 percent to 86 percent. School officials say
a major reason for the drop in crime has been the increase presence ofOfficer Pedro
Rodriguez and the other officers on Beat 1024. As part of their regular tour of duty, they
walk through the high school at least twice a day, meeting with teachers and students.
Metal detectors, security cameras, school patrol officers, and the use of uniforms that ban
gang colors have also contributed.
Three automatic weapons hidden in some overgrown weeds and bushes were
recovered after the Department of Streets and Sanitation responded to a CAPS Service
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Request submitted by officers on Beat 1032. An elderly couple had become imable to
care for their front yard, and gang members were using the location to store weapons and
drugs. Community members informed their beat officers, and Streets and Sanitation
personnel responded quickly to clear away the hiding place.
The people on Beat 1031 wanted to do something about the building near 24*
place and Kedvde. “When I was here,” says former tenant Louis Alvarado, “Gang
problems all the time, the landlord wouldn’t fix anything.”^ Officer John Owens recalls,
“I would see garbage being tossed out the windows into the alley.” Beat facilitators Ann
Galvan and Michael James helped organize tenants and other residents.
Everyone recognized that a problem building impacts the entire community. The
facilitators even held a beat meeting inside the building. CAPS volunteers alerted the
City about conditions, and inspection teams poured into the building. There was already
a court case against the building, but the inspectors wrote 77 new violations.
Now George Dancea is the new building owner. The first day he looked at the
building, tools were stolen fi:om his tmck. “I know the neighborhood is good and I saw
the potential of the building.”* George attends CAPS meetings and is amazed at the
support he has received for residents and police. He has made signifigant repairs to the
building and he carefully screens his tenants. Officer Owens can’t remember the last time
he had a call to the building since the new owner took over.
A resident ofBeat 1031 in Little Village, aimounced at a recent beat meeting that
he wanted to form a walking beat. Four ofhis neighbors joined with him to create the
first community watch group in the 10* district. Every Thursday night for one hour, the
watch group gets together to walk, talk, and stake a claim for a safe community. During
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the walks, group members pick up garbage and make note of things like graffiti and
broken streetlights.
“Once people saw what we were doing, they started cleaning up aromid their
homes and in their own yards,”’ says watch member MariaMonarrez. The presence of
the neighborhood watch group convinced gang members to remove their unsightly
activities firom the area. Says watch member Benjamin Vasquez, “People see us on the
streets and we tell them we’re doing something for the community, and that we own the
streets, not fiie gang bangers.”* Since the walks started, the group has grown to 25
members. Says watch memberMiguel Monarrez, “It’s working, because compared to a
while ago things are nice and quiet. Real nice and quiet.”®
Burglars had hit beats 1031,1032,1033, and 1034 hard. Sometimes, thieves
would team up, and while one person distracted a resident at the front door, another
would enter through the back. Others would simply ring the doorbell, and when no one
answered, enter the house using the gangway or some other means. One burglar even
used a 3-year-old child to help him gain entry.
The 10th District Management Team got together and decided burglary was the
number one priority on the 30 Sector. Police brought the situation to the attention of the
community by distributing maps at beat meetings, which detailed where the burglaries
were occurring. This motivated residents to form watch groups. Neighbors started
helping neighbors. They also let the police know about suspicious activity, an 10*
District officers arrested several burglars. Says Nora LaPorta, “You have that sense of
comaraderie and cooperation between the beat officers and the community residents; you
loose that sense of fear, and that camaraderie and cooperation is working.”'® Since the
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police and the community have come together to work on this problem, burglaries on
those beats have decreased by 35 percent.
Officer’s Maria Rapacz and Gissella Kodatt are a pair of cops who chat about
CAPS. Once amonth, on radio stationWIND-AM, they explore CAPS and crime issues
important to the Hispanic community. Their talk show, which is in Spanish, may focus
on domestic violence, gang awareness, drugs, or guns. “Listeners are very concerned
about gangs, the treatment of their children, and how an officer treats a traffic stop,” says
Rapacz.
WIND gives the officer’s airtime in emergencies, such as cold and heat alerts.
They are able to tell the community where to go for help and how to care for themselves
during these emergencies. Says Kodatt, “We’re able to do so many things by being on
the radio. It’s a tremendous thing for the Spanish community.”" When they are not on
the radio, Kodatt and Rapacz work in the lO* district. Kodatt works in Neighborhood
relations and Rapacz, on Beat 1033, which includes the Little Village community.
Success Stories in District 15 — Austin
Austin is one of the largest and most organized communities in the city. “The
district has at least six good commxmity groups that believe in organizing,”*^ says 15*
district Commander John Richardson. If one person perceives a problem in a community,
chances are many others do, too.
Community organizing is one of the CAPS tools that brings Austin residents and
resources together to solve problems. The North Austin Community Council is currently
focused on the issue of food quality inWest Side stores. Elsewhere, Virgil Crawford, a
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beat facilitator and member of the West Side Authority, has begun a program called
Every Block is a Village (EBV), which was organized to increase the sense of trying to
recruit a citizen leader on each block. Orlean Hvmtly states, “I’m concerned about the
neighborhood. We live here in this community and I feel that ifwe come together and
work, then we canmake our community better.”’^
Austin District Police personnel became aware ofnumerous citizen complaints
around the 700 block ofNorth Waller regarding rampant narcotics activity. At the
direction ofDistrict Commander LeRoy O’Shield, 15* district tatcial teams,
neighborhood relations staff and beat personnel conducted a survey of area residents to
determine the scope and parameters of the problem.
Using the survey results, police were able to identify six area homes around which
the illegal traffic seemed to be concentrated. Additionally, one of the neighborhood
residents allowed police to use his home to conduct a surveillance of suspected narcotics
traffickers. When they were ready, police teams saturated the area, making more that 50
arrests within a two-week period.
The District’s Court Advocacy Conunittee has been closely monitoring these
criminal cases, as the various defendants make their way through the court system.
Following the resounding success, other Austin residents, particularly those in and aroimd
the 5900 block ofWest Rice, are working with 15* district police to use the same
coordinated anti-drug tactics in their neighborhood. Major drug arrests have been made
in the Rice Street operation.
Recently, police officers and residents of Austin’s Beat 1523 came together for
Joint Community-Police Training classes, held at meeting space donated by the Austin
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YMCA. As they discussed CAPS problem solving techniques, it became obvious that the
group’s priority problem centered on a liquor store in the 300 block ofNorth Central.
New owners had just moved in, but the disorderly conditions they inherited were old
news to the neighbors. The store had a walk-up window, where patrons could purchase
liquor and individual cigarettes during late-night hours. Passers-by complained of
harassment by rowdy drunks. “It sounds ridicules, but you’d end up with 300 people
loitering around there at night,”*'' says Officer Patrick Arens.
Police and residents met with the new owners, who agreed to work with his
neighbors. The walk-up window was closed, cigarettes were no longer sold individually,
and storeowner Gus Dayyeh installed a new video security camera. “You got to work
with the community,” Mr. Dayyeh said. And now. Officers Arens states that “I’ve had
several nights in a row when there hasn’t been a single call on this beat. Not a single
call.” The community shares officer Arens’ pleasure. “We worked together with the
police and this business owner,” said resident Aldine Gunn. “And now, it’s just
wonderful. I can’t get over the victory of it.”*’
Approximately 200 Austin residents turned out for the 2"'* Annual CAPS
Convention in May. The Convention is a way for police and community to celebrate
there past successes in fighting crime and to share ideas about neighborhood safety for
the future. Workshops at this year’s CAPS Convention addressed issues of senior citizen
safety, court advocacy, youth programs, ministries, neighborhood safety, and plans by the
Chicago Alliance for Neighborhood Safety (CANS) to increase community efforts in
Austin. CANS has begun working with 15* district police to better organize blocks and
neighborhoods to get involved in CAPS.
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Just recently, CAPS was center stage for a presidential visit. Members of the 15*
District Advisory Committee, along with citizen beat facilitators, community leaders, the
Austin Senior Council, and numerous residents, shared the center stage with Mayor
RichardM. Daley, Police Superintendent Matt L. Rodriguez, and city, state and federal
officials during a visit by President Bill Clinton to the 15the District Station on June 30*.
The President received the Abraham Lincoln Courage Award from the Illinois Council
Against Handgun Violence. The Austin District was selected as a backdrop for the
ceremony because of its innovation and success in implementing the CAPS program.
Success Stories in District #22 — Morgan Park
The goal of residents on Beat 2213 is to make Washington Heights the best
community it can be. To make that happen residents had to become organized. They
planned and formed the Washington Heights Association. Residents started out trying to
form a block club, but when community members from different blocks showed up at the
meeting the group decided to become a community association.
The Association’s accomplishments are impressive. Recently, more than two
hundred people took part in a march that in the past had only ten or fifteen people
involved. The Association shut down an alleged drug house near 95* Street, had another
house demolished, and changed the direction of a street to keep drug traffic out of the
neighborhood. The Association also publishes a monthly newsletter highlighting items of
community interest. Says Beat 2213 resident and Association member Belinda
Henderson, “We pretty much hand deliver the newsletter door to door, because we want
to greet the community. We want to talk to our neighbors. We want to get our
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commimity and neighbors involved.” The spirit of care and cooperation is evident within
the community. Says Beat 2213 resident and Associationmember RobertWashington, “I
foimd out that working together we could do more than working alone. So I am glad they
started the Washington Heights Association.”'^
Residents on Beat 2222, in the Southwest Side Brainard community, know what it
takes to achieve community success. They continue to use CAPS tools to solve problems
that threaten the welfare of their community. Says Beat 2222 Facilitator Reverend
Spencer Jones, “The quality of life is better in this neighborhood than it has been in
twenty-five years.””
To achieve community success, fifty or more residents regularly attend monthly
beat meetings. At each beat meeting, the community and police identify problems and
develop general strategies. Later, a special problem-solving committee meets separately
to work with police on more specific strategies. Residents are credited with closing down
a drug house, establishing a neighborhood phone tree, putting in lights and addresses on
the front and back ofhomes, and attacking loitering outside a liquor store. With each
success, residents gain more skill and confidence to solve problems on their own. Ways
Jones, “It’s ongoing, you cannot just give problems to police and do nothing; you have to
sit down and help them come with ways to solve the problem.”
Eileen Field’s nightmare began two years ago when she broke up with her then
boyfriend, James Sonne. Sonne immediately began a relentless stalking campaign
against her, telephoning her hundreds of times and following her everywhere, even
threatening her and her children with a fake hand grenade. Finally, last year, James
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Sonne was sentenced to two years for stalking, but never backed offhis threatening
behavior, repeatedly calling and writing Ms. Field from prison.
When Ms. Field learned that Sonne was about to be released, she was afraid that
Sonne would return, and that no one would believe her fears. But the officers of the 22"'*
district listened, and they believed. Officer Ray Macey escorted Ms. Field to a beat
meeting so she could alert her neighbors to help keep watch. The police kept watch too.
“We put together a special attention around the clock,” Tact Lieutenant Tom Folliard told
CrimeWatch. “Officers on all three shifts were aware of the problem, the offender’s
release date, and the terms of the order ofprotection.”'® Ms. Field’s concern, and the
officers’ vigilance paid off. The very night after Sonne was released from prison, Officer
Jerry Shannon caught him in the predawn horns loitering across the street from Ms.
Field’s home. Sonne is being held without bond, chargedwith felony stalking.
Success Stories in District #24 — Rogers Park
The enthusiasm of the crowd gathered in front of a boarded-up building on 1528
West Morse Avenue represented a major victory for the far north side community.
“Citizens were afraid to walk by the building because they would be confronted for the
sale of narcotics or by prostitutes,”*’ says Beat 2431 Officer Debra Thaxton. “Between
January and the middle of June there were over 100 arrests and over 30 of those arrests
were drug related,”^" says ChiefAssistant Corporation Counsel Patricia Holmes.
The conmiunity tried working with the building owner, but he wouldn’t
cooperate. The building manager got to the point where she could not control the
building. She went to the police station and handed the keys over to the police. After
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that, the police evicted illegal tenants and found new homes for the others. They began a
zero tolerance mission, arresting 158 people for illegal activities in the vicinity of the
building. Court Advocates went to court with pictures of the building and testimony on
its condition. Since then, the mortgage holder has agreed to work with 2431 to ensure
that a responsible owner takes over the property.
Portions ofHoward Street, the boarder between Chicago and Evanston, have long
been a source of problems for both cities. Now, 24* district police are teaming up with
Evanston police in a cooperative effort to make Howard Street safer for residents on both
sides of the border. On one recent evening, approximately 60 police officers from
Chicago and Evanston came together outside a problem apartment building identified by
the community. “I hope it sends out a message that people are watching and that we’re
serious about changing conditions around here,”^’ says Beat 2424 facilitator Brian
Scruggs.
Following roll-call, the officers headed out into the community, some in patrol
cars, others on foot. They canvass the area, looking for leads on a series of gang and drug
related shootings along Howard Street. Many offenders were caught and arrested. Says
Evanston police officer Robert Dziura, “We are doing our best to show the residents in
these area that two communities can work together to quell the crime problem in Chicago
and Evanston.”^
In response to complaints for community groups and individuals about residential
burglaries in the North of Howard neighborhood. Tactical Officers Donna Strand and
Michael Decker initiated a burglary mission in the area. What they came across instead
was a major drug operation, which they helped shut down. While in the area in mid-
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April, the officers noticed suspicious activity on the 7700 block ofNorth Paulina Street,
in particular, two individuals in a parked car and a third subject exiting a building
carrying a large duffel bag. When the man with the duffel bag saw the officers, he turned
away from the vehicle, and instead walked to a nearby parking lot, where he dropped the
bag between two cars. The duffel bag foimd contained 15 pounds of marijuana, and the
man who was carrying it was placed imder arrest. With the assistance of other 24*''
district officers, police arrested the two men in the parked car and a woman who lived in
a nearby apartment. Confiscated from the second-floor apartment were another 11
pounds ofmarijuana, three handguns, more than $32,000 in cash and drug paraphernalia.
Gang members, as it turns out, ran the drug operation, from the north and South sides of
Chicago.
As we can see, Chicago has made many advances to control their problems of
drug trafficking and gang activity. Operation Weed and Seed in the form of the CAPS
program has been one of these advances. This strategy has also led to the ciirrent anti¬
loitering ordinance which has led to the arrest of a number of Chicago’s youth,
specifically black youth. The residents of these communities have praised the CAPS
program and labeled it a success. But it will be interesting to see the long terms affects of
this type of legislation and community policing. As more and more and more innocent
people get arrested, will the community still deem this program a success?
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THE RACIAL IMPLICATIONS OF WEED AND SEED PROGRAMS IN
CHICAGO. H^LINOIS
Former President George Bush in regards to the Weed and Seed program made
the following statement. According to President Bush:
Weed and Seed works this way. First, we join federal, state and local forces
to “weed out” the gang leaders, the violent criminals, and drug dealers who
plague our neighborhoods. When we break their deadly grip, we follow up
with part two: we “seed” those neighborhoods with expanded educational
opportunities and social services. But key to the seed concept will be jobs
generating initiatives such as Enterprise Zones—to give people who call
these neighborhoods home something to hope for.*
This statement would lead many to believe that Operation Weed and Seed is a program
put in place to help those in urban areas combat crime, drug activity and gangs. But this
statement, as well as this program has a much deeper meaning. In actuality Operation
Weed and Seed works this way. First, it imposes a federal police presence in inner city,
low-income neighborhoods that violate the civil rights and civil liberties of community
residents. Then, it commandeers existing federal social service programs and places them
imder the authority of the Department of Justice and the FBI. Then, it subordinates the
economies of low-income target areas to the enterprise zone concept so that the labor and
resources of communities serve the interest of business. In short, the federal Weed and
Seed program is a move towards the impositions of a police state on the public life of
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low-income, communities of color. The reality of this statement can be seen in the racial
stratification ofChicago’s police districts, and the five prototype districts originally chose
to launch the Weed and Seed program. In four of the five prototype districts, there was a
considerably higher amount ofblacks than were whites in these districts. (See Table 10)
These numbers are not a coincidence, but instead show the racist and repressive nature of
this program.
TABLE 10
1990 Chicago Population bv Police District
District White Black Asian Other Total
7th 856 105,276 120 184 106,542
10th 26,202 47,847 403 57,059 131,832
15th 2,809 60,652 173 271 63,856
22nd 45,096 71,314 306 342 117,190
24th 88,645 23,104 17,130 8,247 137,682
Data compiled by Wes Skogan, Northwestern University from the 1990 Census
The Criminalization ofBlack Youth
To anchor any theory of society with the view that some yoimg people in low-
income communities, no mater how bad their individual behavior, are simply “weeds” to
be rooted out and burned, avoids all the complex ethical and human question that any
parent of those children might have. Parents of youth who are having problems with
drugs or gangs, and who are engaging in anti-social behavior, ask themselves, “Why is
my child acting this way?” “What can I do to change his or her behavior?”
There are many parents in low-income communities who understand that in the
case ofextreme and dangerous behavior, police intervention and prison sentences are
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necessary. Nevertheless, it is an inhumane and unethical perspective that views youth
who are gang members as “weeds” rather than as young people whose problems society
must help solve, for their own sake as well as others
It must be remembered that drug use, crime, and violence are increasingly
widespread in predominantly white, middle class communities as well. But in those
commmiities, the policy ofmost parents is to clean up or cover up their children’s
behavior and to have sentences commuted to probation and community service, with the
hope that eventually the kids will “straighten out” and replicate their parents climb to
upward mobility. The double standard -the use of lenient police and court policies for
white, middle class and often suburban youth versus the intensification of the already
brutal policies toward young people of color of the iimer city -will be only intensified
with the implementation ofWeed and Seed.
While racist stereotypes are used against all low-income communities of color, the
group most scapegoated and falsely categorized is the black youth. The Weed and Seed
program begins by targeting areas with, among other things, high incidence of “gang
activity.” But in fact, the police simply equate being in a “database” that they created
with being in a gang. The image orchestrated by the Right, that any kids coming out of a
bowling alley, and kids talking back to a policeman, any kids involved in drug or violent
activity are part of a gang conspiracy, imdermines any serious discussion about the causes
and cures ofurban crime.
A central component of the gang image is that gang members are heavily
involved in drug trafficking and that most of the violence results from that involvement.
However, a report by Malcolm Klien, Cheryl Maxson and Lea Cunningham ofUSC,
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based on a thorough investigation of records from the LAPD and L.A. County Sheriffs
Department, drew conclusions that refuted many of these stereotypes. They foimd that:
“street sales incidents would not show control of crack distribution by street gangs,” and
that, “evidence would not demonstrate major changes in sales-related violence or in other
variables attributable to street gang involvement in sales, wither over time or as compared
^ »
with non-gang crack sales.”^
Continuing studies by the same researchers have reinforced their earlier work. In
an interview, co-author Cheryl Maxson explained the more recent findings, which
distinguish gangs, drugs, and violence; (a) Most gang violence is primarily related to
gang issues, such as rivalries, and not to drugs; (b) Most drug related violence is not gang
related.^ The new study concluded, “We find no evidence of spiraling effects of drug
involvement in homicides between the mid and later years of the 1980’s. Again we
conclude that concern for specific gang/drug/violence connections has been overstated, at
least in Los Angles.'* It would seem likely that these types of findings would apply to
most urban areas in the United States. But as I might expect, since the research findings
did not confirm police assertions of an increased danger of gang violence due to drug
activity, and support increased hiring ofpolice, the findings were rejected by federal,
state and local law enforcement agencies.
Under the U.S. Constitution each person’s civil rights are supported by
protections against police and government abuse, such as protection against illegal search
and seizure, and self-incrimination. The political Right has worked hard to develop
popular support to take away these constitutional protections of individuals, again on the
theory that people of color create a collective danger to the public safety of our
communities. Protecting “the rights of the victim” has often been the pretext for
eradicating the constitutional rights ofus all.
Not satisfied that a whole generation ofRegan judges have erodedmost
individual liberties, the Weed and Seed strategy operates on the idea of substituting a law
enforcement approach thatwill obviously lead to an enormous number of false arrests, to
be followed by an even greater number ofbeatings, jailing, and charges against suspects
for “resisting arrest.” We have already seen this happening in Chicago with the Morales
case, and other who have been arrested under the anti-loitering ordinance. The openly
stated goal of imposing “tough Federal preventative detention statutes”* indicates a plan
to arrest “suspects” in anticipation of their committing a crime and holding them without
bail throughout the trial period. This can be an appealing concept given the very real
threat ofcommunity violence, but a chilling one if the street sweeps, and anti-loitering
ordinances continue rounding up large numbers of innocent inner-city youth.
The process of criminalization of geographical conununities can be seen in
placement of selected neighborhoods under federal control, like the five prototype
districts in Chicago, and in the gang stereotyping ofyoung people of color discussed
above. IfWeed and Seed continues to exist in Chicago, it will be able to build upon the
existing violations of civil rights that are already far to prevalent in the City.
The Federalization ofLaw Enforcement
Federal control of law enforcement brings it harsher sentences and recognizes
fewer civil rights. As the American Civil Liberties Union of the State of Illinois, in
opposing the Weed and Seed program for Chicago, explained, “Under federal law, an
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offender can be imprisoned for up to three times as long as a similar offender sentenced
under Illinois law.”
The U.S. Sentencing Commission has reported that 63% of the people
incarcerated vmder federal mandatory sentencing laws were Black or Latino, and that one
third of the total had no prior criminal record. It also reported that proscutorial discretion
in federal cases, “appears to be related to the race of the defendant,” giving grater
leniency to white defendants and imposing stricter penalties on defendants of color.
Federal laws, as supported by Supreme Court rulings, often recognize fewer civil
liberties than state laws. For example, cities participating in federal crime prevention
programs such as Weed and Seed have been allowed by judges to “tag” cars with
surveillance devices even before a crime has been committed.
When local agencies are given the option of arresting suspects under either state
or federal law, there is the probability of an increase in racial discrimination. The ACLU
further argued that “Under Weed and Seed, Chicago’s white neighborhoods would be
governed by state law and our black neighborhoods would suffer under harsher federal
law.” This is some ofwhat we can expect from increased federal role in local law
enforcement.
The Root of the Drug Crisis in the United States
The root of the drug crisis is the medical problem of drug addiction. Although the
criminal apparatus of the drug trade, and the violence that accompanies it demand law
enforcement measures, relying primarily on policing to solve the drug crisis is a
hopelessly deluded approach. The complex discussion in our society must focus on
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medical, therapeutic, and community-based approaches, and on a real effort to stop drug
sales at the top.
But the political Right, which has no interest in or capacity for solving social
problems, prefers to hide behind the mythical image of the once-and-for-all “crack-down”
on drugs. This would be a furmy concept if it were not so tragic, since the “crack-down”
would have to extend to every corporate board room in the U.S., to every college
dormitory, to many private homes, to the entire entertainment industry, to the U.S. Senate
and house office buildings, and to the White House.
But by its definition. Weed and Seed only applies to low-income -and in most
cases, primarily black communities. Weed and Seed calls for special task forces
composed of federal agencies such as the FBI, the DBA, the Justice Department, the U.S.
Attorney, and local law enforcement offices. These task forces would be under federal
control, and would utilize federal laws to subject suspects to “speedy trials,” and
“mandatory minimum sentences.”
In terms ofpolice behavior in the community, the “Weed” game plan as defined
by the Department of Justice is based on occupying mentality, if possible with the
sanction of community leaders. Their announce tactics would include “street sweeps,”
“use of sophisticated audio-visual evidence-gathering techniques,” “intensified narcotics
investigation,” and “targeted prosecutions.”*
Weed and Seed as a Strategy to Co-opt Community Leadership
Many community organizations and social service agencies have been formed out
of a deep concern for the human beings and the social problems in low-income
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communities. Many of the staffof these organizations and agencies have dedicated their
lives to their communities. Operation Weed and Seed presents an ethical and practical
challenge to such agencies and organizations. It begins by creating an unethical and
politically destructive link between federal law enforcement programs and the funding of
social service programs. Furthermore, it does so by creating an illusion of increased
social funding.
Cleverly, the Bush administration and the office of the Attorney General, have
funneled funds already earmarked for communities into the Weed and Seed program,
thus, continuing the illusion that they are providing social service funding. In Table 1 we
can see all of the existing programs that will contribute to the Weed and Seed program.
TABLE 11
Programs Contributing to Weed and Seed’




Office of Justice (OJP) Demonstrations 10
Subtotal Justice 30
Department ofLabor
Job Training Partnership Act 28
Youth opportunities Unlimited 5
Senior Community Service Employment 9
Job Corps 50
Subtotal Labor 92
Department ofHealth and Human Services
Treatment Improvement Grants 36
Capacity Expansion Grants 47
High Risk Youth/Pregnant Women Prevention 7
Community Partnership Grants 4
Aid to Families with Dependant Children 43
Head Start 54
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Community Health Centers 35
Subtotal HHS 226
Department ofHousing and Urban Development
Public Housing Modernization 20
Housing Vouchers 20
Community Development Block Grants 44




School Improvement/Pre-College Outreach 30
Family Literacy and Adult Education 10
Subtotal Education 56
Department ofTransportation 1
Department ofAgriculture: Women, Infants, Children _5
Total for 1993 500
If this trend is not reversed, there will eventually be one major agency
administering funds to urban areas, the Department of Justice, and imder itwill be
agencies dealing with health, education, welfare, agriculture, housing and labor. Again,
this is not an effort to project very far into the future, this is a explicit part ofWeed and
Seed’s strategy in the present. At this point in history, there is a need for a revitalized,
progressive movement rooted in communities of color to preserve and expand those
community’s ethical, organizational, and human resources. Operation Weed and Seed is
a broader strategy than it proclaims. The strategy is inner city domination, when in fact
the strategy should be one that places the rights and needs of communities of color and
low-income people at the forefront of social policy, and one that can mount an effective
opposition to increased police repression.
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CHAPTERV
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
The U.S. Department of Justice launched Operation Weed and Seed in 1991 to
demonstrate that a large array of resources can be mobilized in a comprehensive,
coordinated effort to control crime and drugs and improve the quality of life in targeted
high-crime neighborhoods. The initiative’s name was drawn out from its two-pronged
strategy: to “weed out” violent offenders through intensive law enforcement and
prosecution and to “seed” the neighborhood with prevention, intervention, treatment, and
revitalization services. An integral part of this strategy involves community policing,
which is designed to bridge the gap between weeding and seeding.
Despite differences in the size and nature of target neighborhoods and in the
severity of crime and drug problems, 19 cities were awarded approximately $1.1 million
for an 18-month demonstration period.' Through steering committees, community
policing prosecutions, weed task forces, and seed committees, groups ofpeople who
ordinarily did not communicate with each other came together to coordinate efforts, share
resources and solve problems. The reasons and capacity for getting together existed prior
to Weed and Seed, but the Department of Justice feels that the motivation and vehicles
for doing so was to come from this program’s implementation. Contributions of time and
resources from agencies, community organizations and individuals undoubtedly exceeded
the Federal grants funds allocated for the program.
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The Weed and Seed strategy has been labeled a success by many. Testimonies
have been given from the President of the United States, to the Mayor of Chicago, and by
residents of the five prototype districts in Chicago, praising this particular strategy. In
October of 1996, the Department ofJustice released an evaluation ofOperation Weed
and Seed. The following statements were released regarding its strengths and
weaknesses:
In regards to effective weeding, the extent to which the program succeeded in
removing the most violent and problematic offenders from target
neighborhoods is unknown. Of the tens of thousands of Weed and Seed
arrest cases prosecuted, the majority were reported as pending. Over 92%
were prosecuted by local district attorneys, many of them in locations in
which jail caps and prison overcrowding may limit the length of sentences
even where convictions were obtained. Yet it is also certain that a number of
serious criminals were convicted under Federal law and sentenced to lengthy
prison terms.
For effective weeding formation of interagency task forces consisting of all
relevant Federal, State and local law enforcement agencies should be
considered. Future efforts should include recognition of and support of the
critical role of local prosecutors. They should participate from the outset on
interagency task forces and be granted additional funds to deal with the
increased caseload promulgated by the Weed and Seed program.
The Weed and Seed program helped spread and reinforce the idea of
community policing, which was a positive experience for both the
community and police agencies. It also helped demonstrate that enforcement
can be enhanced by close contacts with the community and that enforcement
and service are not necessarily incompatible police functions. Community
policing principles should be advocated and supported by police departments
and city governments, with appropriate recognition, compensation and room
for advancement for officers. Model efforts should include training for
citizens and police, means for officers to possess a sense of ownership of the
area they serve and substantial coordination among service providers and
enforcement personnel.
Federal seeding coordination and funding were much less than Federal
weeding support and seeding services became the primary responsibility of
city agencies. Yet despite the problems in Federal funding of seeding
activities, several communities discovered the resources within themselves to
launch a number ofprevention and restoration efforts. It is unlikely that they
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Would have done this so quickly without the focus and coordination by the
Weed and Seed program. It cannot be determined by the national process
evaluation if the “right” seeding activities were supported or if enough
seeding was activated. But generally, given the seriousness of target
neighborhoods’ drug and social problems, extent of physical deterioration
and severe economic problems, seeding activities alone could have overcome
them, especially in the time allotted.
The dual approach of prevention and revitalization within seeding should be
continued and training and technical assistance for citizens in leadership,
planning and program development mid management is recommended. In the
context of the current policy debate over whether to provide funding for
enforcement and incarceration or prevention, the Weed and Seed programs
serve as a demonstration that the sensible answer is both. Seeding is seeding
cannot be deterred from the economic attractions of drug dealing until
weeding results in a basin level of security.^
There is no doubt that the United States faces a number of problems in terms of
gangs, drugs and juvenile delinquency. This was made evident in the review of literature
with the shocking statistics concerning juveniles especially black youth. But Operation
Weed and Seed does not seem to be the strategy to solve the problem, but rather a
strategy to cover up years of neglect endured by generations of black youth. Its only
solution is to put the youth in jail. This type of action has a harsh affect on black youth
since research shows that black youth are arrested at a much higher rate that whites.
Secondly, that the sentencing of white youth is generally more lenient than that of black
youth. And finally that people living in major urban areas will have to live under harsher
Federal laws, while others in the suburbs of the same state will not.
This was very evident in Chicago with the five districts that were initially chosen
to implement the CAPS Program. Four of the five districts were majority black districts.
Which means that there is a greater possibility for black youth to be arrested under this
strategy than whites. This stands true for the anti-loitering ordinance which has
incarcerated thousands of people, majority youth, with fewer than 1% of the accused
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were ever prosecuted. This type of legislation is an infringement to people’s first
amendment assembly and association rights as seen in the case Chicago vs. Morales.
The reason these types ofprograms and legislation have not been combated by the
communities is because they have been presented to them in a way in which it looks like
the Federal government is sincere about inaproving their quality of life. But what many
have failed to realize is what the long-term affects of this program and that ordinance will
have on the black conununity in the future. This misunderstanding goes back to Mack
Jones’ statement in Chapter I regarding ones worldview. “Closely connected with the
world view of the second part of the web, a set of normative assumptions which
summarizes a people’s perception of the nature of good life and the political, economic
and cultural forms necessary for its realization.”^ Community residents have not yet seen
the destructive side ofWeed and Seed. This could be due to lack of education on the part
of the residents, with a little over 700,000 people lacking even a high school education.
Policy makers have taken a backseat to these policies as well, and should also be held
accoimtable for not combating negative aspects this program brings.
In concluding this research, the following observations and assumptions can be
made. The word success can be defined inmany different ways. In the case of the Weed
and Seed, success was equated a greater number of arrest. In many of the success stories
given the Chicago Districts, many of the ofiBcers referred to the increase of the number of
arrest since the program began. It is my position that a greater number of arrests equal
better service, or a better quality of life. Secondly that a greater amount ofmoney was
spent on “weeding” than was on “seeding.” Seeding is a subject that was rarely
mentioned in the research, which led the reader to believe that there was very little
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“seeding” going on, if any at all. The Department of Justice mentioned this disparity
very briefly in their process evaluation and stated that in the future a better job will be
done on implementing and sustaining “seeding” programs. Finally, that community
policing and Weed and Seed will continue to be an integral part of the Department of
Justice Programs to combat crime, juvenile delinquency, drug abuse and gang activity.
Anti-loitering ordinances will continue to be introduced until the Supreme Court will
declare one constitutional and many major cities will follow its model. Community
policing and Weed and Seed will continue to operate in exclusively minority
communities, until the communities become more aware of its long-term implications
and put pressure on state and local officials to make a change.
There is no question that communities of color suffer from an urgent need for
resources to address the growing social crisis in urban life. These communities have
suffered from the unrelenting assault by the political right over the past 12 years, which
has rolled back and reversed the few gains of the civil rights movement and reestablished
racist stereotyping in national policy. When combined with the decline of mass social
change, these factors have caused some of the most progressive community leaders and
organizations to compromise their beliefs and strategies in order to adjust to the harsh
new realities of our time.
At this point in history, there is a need for a revitalized, progressive movement in
communities of color to preserve and expand those communities ethical, organizational
and human resources. Weed and seed is more than a tactic, as Weed and Seed proclaims,
it is part of a broader strategy. The strategy seems to be inner city domination. What is
needed is a progressive movement that can place the rights and needs of communities of
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color, especially low-income people at the forefront of social policy and one that can




Department of Justice, Operation Weed and Seed Process Evaluation. (March 1998): 2.
^Ibid, 12-14.
^ Jones, op.cit., 44.
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JUSTICE NICKELS delivered the opinion of the court:
These consolidated appeals involve 70 defendants who were
charged with violating the City of Chicago's Gang Congregation
Ordinance (Chicago Municipal Code sec. 8— 4—015 (added June
17, 1992)). In cause No. 80668, defendant Youkhana and 13
other defendants were charged with violating the ordinance. The
Cook County circuit court granted defendants' motion to dismiss
the city's actions against them, finding the ordinance
unconstitutionally vague. The appellate court affirmed, holding
the ordinance unconstitutional on several grounds. Youkhana,
277 Ill. App. 3d 101.
In cause No. 80485, the Cook County circuit court
dismissed the charges against defendant Ramsey and 49 other
defendants, also finding the ordinance unconstitutional. In cause
No. 80479, after separate bench trials in the Cook County circuit
court, defendant Morales and five other defendants were found
guilty of violating the ordinance and each sentenced to jail terms
ranging from 1 to 27 days. The appellate court reversed the
convictions of the Morales defendants based on its holding in
Youkhana (Morales, Nos. 1—93-4039, 1—93—4351, 1—93—4356,
1—94—1542, 1—94—3065, 1--94--4062 cons, (unpublished order
under Supreme Court Rule 23)), and affirmed the dismissal of
the actions against the Ramsey defendants (Ramsey, Nos. 1—93—
4125, 1—93—4126, 1—94—0220, 1—94— 0876, 1—94—0877, 1-94-
-1541, 1—95—0191, 1—95—0246 cons, (unpublished order under
Supreme Court Rule 23)). The appellate court granted the city's
request for a certificate of importance in Youkhana (155 Ill. 2d
R. 316), and this court granted the city's petitions for leave to
appeal in the other two causes (155 Ill. 2d R. 315). We
consolidated the three causes for purposes of this appeal.
BACKGROUND
• In May 1992, the Chicago city council held hearings to
explore the problems criminal street gangs present for the city's
residents. Of particular concern was the problems gang members
cause by loitering in public. Witnesses testified how gang
members loiter as part of a strategy to claim territory, recruit
new members, and intimidate rival gangs and ordinary
community residents. Testimony revealed that street gangs are
responsible for a variety of criminal activity, including drive-by
shootings, drug dealing, and vandalism.
As a result of the hearings, the city council enacted the
Gang Congregation Ordinance, more commonly known as the
"gang loitering ordinance." The city council incorporated its
findings in the preamble to the ordinance, as follows:
"WHEREAS, The City of Chicago, like other cities
across the nation, has been experiencing an increasing
murder rate as well as an increase in violent and drug
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related crimes; and
WHEREAS, The City Council has determined that the
continuing increase in criminal street gang activity in
the City is largely responsible for this unacceptable
situation; and
WHEREAS, In many neighborhoods throughout the
City, the burgeoning presence of street gang members
in public places has intimidated many law abiding
citizens; and
WHEREAS, One of the methods by which criminal
street gangs establish control over identifiable areas is
by loitering in those areas and intimidating others from
entering those areas; and
WHEREAS, Members of criminal street gangs avoid
arrest by committing no offense punishable under
existing laws when they know the police are present,
while maintaining control over identifiable areas by
continued loitering; and
WHEREAS, The City Council has determined that
loitering in public places by criminal street gang
members creates a justifiable fear for the safety of
persons and property in the area because of the
violence, drug-dealing and vandalism often associated
with such activity; and
WHEREAS, The City also has an interest in
discouraging all persons from loitering in public places
with criminal gang members; and
WHEREAS, Aggressive action is necessary to
preserve the city's streets and other public places so tha
the public may use such places without fear[.]" Chicago
Municipal Code sec. 8—4—015 (added June 17, 1992).
The gang loitering ordinance provides in pertinent part:
"(a) Whenever a police officer observes a person
whom he reasonably believes to be a criminal street
■
gang member loitering in any public place, with one or
more other persons, he shall order all such persons to
disperse and remove themselves from the area. Any
person who does not promptly obey such an order is in
violation of this section.
(b) It shall be an affirmative defense to an alleged
violation of this section that no person who was
observed loitering was in fact a member of a criminal
street gang.
(c) As used in this section:
(1) 'Loiter' means to remain in any one place with no
apparent purpose.
(2) 'Criminal street gang' means any ongoing
organization, association in fact or group of three or
more persons, whether formal or informal, having as
one of its substantial activities the commission of one
or more of the criminal acts enumerated in paragraph
(3), and whose members individually or collectively
■"




(5) 'Public place' means the public way and any other
location open to the public, whether publicly or
privately owned." Chicago Municipal Code sec. 8—4—
015 (added June 17, 1992).
Each violation of the ordinance is punishable by a fine of up to
$500, imprisonment for not more than six months, and the
requirement to perform up to 120 hours of community service.
During the hearings, representatives of the Chicago law and
police departments informed the city council that any limitations
on the discretion police have in enforcing the ordinance would
be best developed through police policy, rather than placing
such limitations into the ordinance itself. Accordingly, after the
gang loitering ordinance was enacted, the Chicago police
department issued a general order which provides guidelines for
enforcement of the ordinance. Among other things, the general
order sets forth standards for identifying criminal street gangs
and specifies criteria for establishing probable cause that an
individual is a member of a criminal street gang. Chicago Police
Department, General Order No. 92—4 (eff. August 8, 1992) .
Once enforcement of the gang loitering ordinance began,
the circuit courts of Cook County disagreed as to its validity.
Upon review, the appellate court held the ordinance
unconstitutional on several grounds. First, the appellate court
found the ordinance unconstitutionally overbroad because it
violates the first amendment rights of association, assembly, and
expression. In addition, the appellate court found that the
ordinance was unconstitutionally vague. Next, the appellate
court determined the ordinance criminalizes a person's status in
violation of the eighth amendment. Finally, the appellate court
determined the ordinance allows arrests without probable cause,
in violation of the fourth amendment. Youkhana, 277 Ill. App.
3d 101.
The city urges that the judgment of the appellate court be
reversed because the gang loitering ordinance; (1) sufficiently
defines criminal conduct such that it is not unconstitutionally
vague; (2) is not overbroad because it is a permissible restriction
of first amendment rights; (3) does not create a status offense;
and (4) requires the police to establish probable cause of illegal
conduct before an offender can be arrested.
We find that the gang loitering ordinance violates due
process of law in that it is impermissibly vague on its face and
an arbitrary restriction on personal liberties. In doing so, we
need not reach the issues that the ordinance creates a status
offense, permits arrests without probable cause or is overbroad.
ANALYSIS
In construing a municipal ordinance, the same rules are
applied as those which govern the construction of statutes. In re
Application of the County Collector, 132 Ill. 2d 64, 72 (1989).
Statutes are presumed constitutional and it is the court's duty to
construe a legislative enactment-'teo as to affirm its
constitutionality and validity, if it is reasonably susceptible to
such a construction. People v. Haywood, 118 Ill. 2d 263, 271
(1987) . The fundamental rule of statutory construction is to
ascertain and give effect to the true intent and meaning of the
lawmakers. Solich v. George & Anna Fortes Cancer Prevention
Center of Chicago, Inc., 158 Ill. 2d 76, 81 (1994). In doing so,
the courts should look first to the statutory language, for the
language of the statute is the best indication of the lawmaker's
intent. Williams v. Illinois State Scholarship Comm'n, 139 Ill. 2d
24, 51 (1990). Where the meaning of an enactment is clear and-
unambiguous, a court must give it effect as written, without
reading into it limitations or conditions that the lawmakers did
not express. Garza v. Navistar International Transportation
C'orp., 172 Ill. 2d 373, 378 (1996). Moreover, criminal, statutes
are to be strictly construed in favor of an accused and nothing
should be taken by intendment or implication beyond the
obvious or literal meaning of the statute. People v. Woodward,
175 Ill. 2d 435, 444 (1997).
I. Vagueness
A cornerstone of our jurisprudence is that no person shall
be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of
law. U.S. Const., amends. V, XIV; Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, sec.
2. A well-established element of the guarantees of due process
is the requirement that the proscriptions of a criminal statute be
clearly defined. Haywood, 118 Ill, 2d at 269, citing Grayned v.
City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108, 33 L, Ed. 2d 222, 227, 92
S. Ct. 2298, 2298-99 (1972). To successfully challenge a
criminal statute as being vague on its face, the statute must be
impermissibly vague in all of its applications. Village of
Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S,
489, 494-95, 71 L. Ed. 2d 362, 369, 102 S. Ct. 1186, 1191
(1982); Haywood, 118 Ill. 2d at 270. That is, the statute must be
shown to be vague "in the sense that no standard of conduct is
specified at all." Coates v. City of Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611,
614, 29 L. Ed. 2d 214, 217, 91 S. Ct. 1686, 1688 (1971). If on
its face the challenged statute violates the due process clause,
then the specific details of the individual offense would not
serve to validate the statute. Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S.
451, 453, 83 L. Ed. 888, 890, 59 S. Ct. 618, 619 (1939).
To satisfy the vagueness doctrine, a criminal statute must
meet two basic criteria. First, a criminal statute must be
sufficiently definite so that it gives persons of ordinary
intelligence a reasonable opportunity to distinguish between
lawful and unlawful conduct, Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352,
357, 75 L. Ed. 2d 903, 909, 103 S. Ct. 1855, 1858 (1983);
Grayned, 408 U.S. at 108, 33 L. Ed. 2d at 227, 92 S. Ct. at
2298-99; People v. Bailey, 167 Ill. 2d 210, 228 (1995). Second,
a penal statute must adequately define the criminal offense in
such a manner that does not encourage arbitrary and
discriminatory enforcement. Kolender, 461 U.S. at 357-58, 75
L. Ed. 2d at 909, 103 S. Ct. at 1858; Haywood, 118 Ill. 2d at
269; see also Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156,
162, 31 L. Ed. 2d 110, 115, 92 S. Ct. 839, 843 (1972). We
evaluate the provisions of the gang loitering ordinance in light
of the due process criteria.
A. Adequate Notice
. : The first criterion of the void-for-vagueness doctrine
requires a criminal statute to be sufficiently defined so it
provides persons of ordinary intelligence adequate notice of
proscribed conduct. Kolender, 461 U.S. at 357, 75 L. Ed. 2d at
909, 103 S. Ct. at 1858; Grayned, 408 U.S. at 108, 33 L. Ed. 2d
at 227, 92 S. Ct. at 2298-99; Bailey, 167 Ill. 2d at 228. Due
process guarantees this adequate notice of proscribed conduct so
that ordinary persons are not required to guess at a law's
meaning but, rather, can know what conduct is forbidden and
act accordingly. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. at
498, 71 L. Ed. 2d at 371, 102 S. Ct. at 1193; Connally v.
General Construction Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391, 70 L. Ed. 322,
328, 46 S. Ct. 126, 127 (1926). "No one may be required at
peril of life, liberty or property to speculate as to the meaning
of penal statutes. All are entitled to be informed as to what the
State commands or forbids." Lanzetta, 306 U.S. at 453, 83 L.
Ed., at 890, 59 S. Ct. at 619.
Loitering and. vagrancy statutes have been utilized
throughout American history in-an attempt to prevent crime by
removing "undesirable persons" from public before they have
the opportunity to engage in criminal activity. See Papachristou,
405 U.S. at 161-63, 31 L. Ed. 2d at 114-16, 92 S. Ct. at 842-44;
see generally Model Penal Code sec. 250.6, Commentary
(1980); Comment, Is There Something Suspicious About the
Constitutionality of Loitering Laws?, 50 Ohio St. L.J. 717
(1989). Nevertheless, it is well settled that broadly worded
criminal loitering laws which prohibit loitering without
additional unlawful conduct are doubtlessly unconstitutional.
'.See, e.g., Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, 382 U.S. 87, 90,
15 L. Ed. 2d 176, 179, 86 S. Ct. 211, 213 (1965).
The gang loitering ordinance provides that "[w]henever a
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police officer observes a person whom he reasonably believes
to be a criminal street gang member loitering in any public
place with one or more other persons, he shall order all such
persons to disperse and remove themselves from the area. Any
person who does not promptly obey such an order is in violation
of this section." Chicago Municipal Code sec. 8—4—015 (added
June 17, 1992). The city argues that the terms of the ordinance
are sufficiently definite so that ordinary persons can comprehend
the prohibited conduct. We disagree.
The ordinance seeks to criminalize acts of "loitering" in a
public place. Webster's defines "loiter" to mean "to remain in
or near a place in an idle or apparently idle manner" and to
"hang around aimlessly." Webster's Third New International
Dictionary 1331 (1981). The infirmity with this type of
prohibition is that it fails to distinguish between innocent
conduct and conduct calculated to cause harm and "makes
criminal activities which by modern standards are normally
innocent" (Papachristou, 405 U.S. at 163, 31 L. Ed. 2d at 116,
92 S. Ct. at 844). Although persons of ordinary intelligence may
maintain a common and accepted meaning of the word "loiter,"
such term by itself is inadequate to inform a citizen of its
criminal implications. See Territory of Hawaii v. Anduha, 48
F.2d 171, 172-73 (9th Cir. 1931); Arizona ex rel. Williams v.
City Court, 21 Ariz. App. 489, 491, 520 P.2d 1166, 1168
(1974); State v. Hudson, 111 N.H. 25, 26, 274 A.2d 878, 879
(1971); People v. Diaz, 4 N.Y.2d 469, 471, 151 N.E.2d 871,
872, 176 N.Y.S.2d 313, 315 (1958).
The city cites Wiemerslage v. Maine Township High School
District 207, 29 F.3d 1149 (7th Cir. 1994), for the proposition
that the term "loiter" is not unconstitutionally vague. The
Wiemerslage holding is not applicable to the instant case. At
issue in Wiemerslage was the validity of a high school
disciplinary rule prohibiting loitering in a specific area of
campus. The federal court of appeals, in finding that the
prohibitions of the disciplinary rule were not vague, expressly
observed that criminal loitering laws are subject to a more
stringent standard of specificity. Wiemerslage, 29 F.3d at 1152.
Moreover, the definition of "loiter" provided by the
ordinance does not assist in clearly articulating the proscriptions
of the ordinance. The ordinance defines "loiter" to mean "to
remain in any one place with no apparent purpose." Chicago
Municipal Code sec. 8—4—015(c)(1) (added June 17, 1992).
People with entirely legitimate and lawful purposes will not
always be able to make their purposes apparent to an observing
police officer. For example, a person waiting to hail a taxi,
resting on a corner during a jog, or stepping into a doorway to
evade a rain shower has a perfectly legitimate purpose in all
these scenarios; however, that purpose will rarely be apparent to
an observer.
Courts in several other jurisdictions have found similarly
worded prohibitions of criminal loitering statutes
unconstitutionally vague. See, e.g.. United States ex rel.
Newsome v. Malcolm, 492 F.2d 1166 (2d Cir. 1974) (loitering
without apparent reason), aff'd sub. nom. Lefkowitz v. Newsome,
420 U.S. 283, 43 L. Ed. 2d 196, 95 S. Ct. 886 (1975); Powell
V.. Stone, 507 F.2d 93, 95 (9th Cir. 1974) (loitering without
apparent reason), rev'd on other grounds, 428 U.S. 465, 49 L.
Ed. 2d 1067, 96 S. Ct. 3037 (1976); Ricks v. District of
Columbia, 414 F.2d 1097, 1107 (D.C. Cir. 1968) (loitering
without visible business); Kirkwood v. Loeb, 323 F. Supp. 611,
614-15 (W.D. Tenn. 1971) (loitering without any legitimate
purpose); In re C.M., 630 P.2d 593, 596 (Colo. 1981) (loitering
.without legitimate reason); People v. Berck, 32 N.Y.2d 567, 300
’N.E.2d 411, 347 N.Y.S.2d 33 (1973) (loitering without apparent
reason).
83In addition, the city cites several cases for the proposition
that an ordinance prohibiting loitering alone is sufficiently
defined to pass the void-for-vagueness test. However, in all of
the cases cited by the city, the courts upheld ordinances which
criminalized loitering combined with some other overt act or
criminal intent. See, e.g., Williams, 21 Ariz. App. at 491, 520
P.2d at 1168 (loitering for purpose of begging); People v.
Superior Court, 46 Cal. 3d 381, 758 P.2d 1046, 250 Cal. Rptr.
515 (1988) (loitering to solicit lewd or unlawful act); State v.
Eclcer, 311 So. 2d 104 (Fla. 1975) (loitering in an unusual
manner under circumstances which warrant alarm); Bell v. State,
252 Ga. 267, 313 S.E.2d 678 (1984) (same); State v. Armstrong,
282 Minn. 39, 162 N.W.2d 357 (1968) (loitering with intent to
solicit prostitution). Moreover, several of the cases cited by the
city expressly recognize that a law which criminalizes
"loitering" alone would be unconstitutionally vague. See, e.g.,
Williams, 21 Ariz. App. at 491, 520 P.2d at 1168; Ecker, 311
So. 2d at 107; Camarco v. City of Orange, 116 N.J. Super. 531,
534, 283 A.2d 122, 126 (1971). The city's argument is without
merit.
These cases demonstrate that when the term "loitering" is
joined with a second specific element to form the prohibited
conduct defined by a criminal loitering statute, courts have
uniformly found that the law sufficiently informs persons as to
the forbidden conduct and, thus, is not vague. The city contends,
in the alternative, that the gang loitering ordinance's prohibited
conduct is made up of specific elements in addition to mere
loitering.
1. Loitering With a Criminal Street Gang Member
First, the city argues that the ordinance prohibits loitering
with the additional element of being with a member of a
criminal street gang. Initially, we must observe that, literally
read, the gang loitering ordinance does not prohibit loitering
with a criminal street gang member. Rather, the ordinance
requires only that the arresting officer have a reasonable belief
that one person in a group of loiterers is a gang member.
However, a reasonable belief, or probable cause, is
insufficient to support a criminal conviction. See People v.
Nash, 173 Ill. 2d 423, 431 (1996). In addition, this added
element is itself vague, as it conveys no precise warning of the
proscribed conduct understandable by an ordinary person. An
individual standing on a street corner with a group of people has
no way of knowing whether an approaching police officer has
a reasonable belief that the group contains a member of a
criminal street gang. That condition depends solely on the police
officer's subjective evaluation of the facts of the situation in
light of his own experience. See Kolender, 461 U.S. at 368-69,
75 L. Ed. 2d at 916, 103 S. Ct. at 1864 (Brennan, J.,
concurring).
, If the city intended to require actual knowledge on a
defendant's part of another loiterer's gang membership, then that
knowledge, must be established as a fact in order to support a
conviction. See Lanzetta, 306 U.S. at 458, 83 L. Ed. at 893, 59
S. Ct. at 621; accord People ex rel. Gallo v. Acuna, 14 Cal. 4th
1090, 929 P.2d 596, 60 Cal. Rptr. 2d 277 (1997) (imposing
requirement of actual knowledge on part of defendant of other
party's gang membership status in order for injunction to pass
scrutiny under the vagueness doctrine). Although the ordinance
provides an affirmative defense which allows the defendant to
show that no one in the group was actually a gang member, this
affirmative defense does not cure the defect. Showing that one
.person in a group of loiterers is a gang member does not
■ultimately prove that a defendant had knowledge of that fact.
Furthermore, even adding a knowing association with a gang
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member to the act of loitering is still insufficient because the
city cannot "forbid, on pain of criminal punishment, assembly
with others merely to advocate activity, even if that activity is
criminal in nature" (People v. Nash, 173 Ill. 2d 423, 431-32
(1996), citing Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 448-49, 23
L. Ed. 2d 430, 434-35, 89 S. Ct. 1827, 1830 (1969)).
2. Failure to Obey a Dispersal Order
The city contends that another specific element of the
offense of gang loitering is the failure to obey a police order to
disperse. This is also insufficient to cure the vagueness of the
ordinance. In Shuttlesworth, the Supreme Court reviewed a
conviction pursuant to an ordinance .which made it " 'unlawful
for any person to stand or loiter upon any street or sidewalJc . . .
after having been requested by any police officer to move on.' "
Shuttlesworth, 382 U.S. at 90-92, 15 L. Ed. 2d at 179-80, 86 S.
Ct. at 213-14. The Court determined that, as written, the
ordinance was unconstitutionally vague because it allowed a
person to "stand on a public sidewalk *** only at the whim of
any police officer." Shuttlesworth, 382 U.S. at 90-92, 15 L. Ed.
2d at 179-80, 86 S. Ct. at 213-14.
The proscriptions of the gang loitering ordinance are
essentially the same as the Shuttlesworth ordinance. Merely
adding the element of refusing to obey an order by police to
disperse does not elevate the gang loitering ordinance to such a
level that it provides adequate notice of proscribed conduct. See
State V. Hudson, 111 N.H. at 26, 274 A.2d at 879 (merely
loitering cannot be made criminal, even if statute requires
refusal of police's order to disperse); Kirkwood, 323 F. Supp. at
616 (violation of loitering ordinance conditioned upon failure to
move when directed to do so by police officer includes
unconstitutionally vague standards). Moreover, this
determination is consistent with our prior holdings. See, e.g..
City of Chicago v. Meyer, 44 Ill. 2d 1, 5 (1969) (police may
arrest persons for failing to obey an order to cease otherwise
lawful conduct, but only after the police have made all
reasonable efforts to maintain order and the conduct produces an
imminent threat of uncontrollable violence or riot).
Furthermore, if the underlying statute is itself impermissibly
vague, as the gang loitering ordinance here, then a conviction
based upon failure to obey the order of a police officer pursuant
to that statute cannot stand. See Shuttlesworth, 382 U.S. at 90-
92, 15 L. Ed. 2d at 179-80, 86 S. Ct. at 213-14. The city
correctly observes that it is free to prevent people from
obstructing traffic and blocking the public way. However, it
must do so "through the enactment and enforcement of
ordinances directed with reasonable specificity toward the
conduct to be prohibited." Coates, 402 U.S. at 614, 29 L. Ed. 2d
at 217, 91 S. Ct. at 1688, citing Gregory v. City of Chicago, 394
U.S. Ill, 118, 124-25, 22 L. Ed. 2d 134-40, 139, 143, 89 S. Ct.
946, 950, 953-54 (1969) (Black, J., concurring, joined by
Douglas, J.).
...For these reasons, we find that the gang loitering ordinance
fails to meet the adequate notice standards of the vagueness
doctrine.
B. Arbitrary Enforcement
The second and more important aspect of the vagueness
doctrine is the requirement that a penal statute must adequately
define a criminal offense in such a manner that does not
encourage arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement. Kolender,
461 U.S. at 357-58, 75 L. Ed. 2d at 909, 103 S. Ct. at 1858;
Haywood, 118 Ill. 2d at 269; see also Papachristou, 405 U.S. at
'162, 31 L. Ed. 2d at 115, 92 S. Ct. at 843. Where lawmakers
fail to provide minimal guidelines to govern law enforcement.
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a criminal law "may permit 'a standardless sweep [that] allows
policemen, prosecutors, and juries to pursue their personal
predilections.' " Kolender, 461 U.S. at 358, 75 L. Ed. 2d at 909,
103 S. Ct. at 1858, quoting Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 575,
39 L. Ed. 2d 605, 613, 94 S. Ct. 1242, 1248 (1974). Moreover,
when a law fails to provide standards regulating the exercise of
its discretion, "the scheme permits and encourages an arbitrary
and discriminatory enforcement of the law. [The law] furnishes
a convenient tool for 'harsh and discriminatory enforcement by
local prosecuting officials, against particular groups deemed to
merit their displeasure.' " Papachristou, 405 U.S. at 170, 31 L.
Ed. 2d at 120, 92 S. Ct. at 847, quoting Thornhill v. Alabama,
310 U.S. 88, 97-98, 84 L. Ed. 1093, 1100, 60 S. Ct. 736, 742
(1940).
The gang loitering ordinance fails to meet these standards.
The ordinance provides such ambiguous definitions of its
elements that it does not discourage arbitrary or discriminatory
enforcement. The definition of loitering as "to remain in any one
place with no apparent purpose" provides absolute discretion to
police officers to decide what activities constitute loitering.
Moreover, police are given complete discretion to determine
whether any members of a group are gang members. These
guidelines do not conform with accepted standards for defining
a criminal offense.
Where a criminal ordinance vests unfettered discretion in
the police to determine whether a suspect's conduct has violated
the ordinance, it "entrust[s] lawmaking 'to the moment-to-
moment judgment of the policeman on his beat' " (Smith, 415
U.S. at 575, 39 L. Ed. 2d at 613, 94 S. Ct. at 1248, quoting
Gregory v. City of Chicago, 394 U.S. Ill, 120, 22 L. Ed. 2d
134, 141, 89 S. Ct. 946, 951 (1969) (Black, J., concurring,
joined by Douglas, J.)), and "confers on police a virtually
unrestrained power to arrest and charge persons with a
violation" (Lewis v. City of New Orleans, 415 U.S. 130, 135, 39
L. Ed. 2d 214, 220, 94 S. Ct. 970, 973 (1974) (Powell, J.,
concurring)).
The city does not dispute that the ordinance grants the
police department a vast amount of discretion in its
enforcement. In fact, the city itself points out that the Chicago
police department urged the city council to exclude from the
ordinance any limitations on the discretion the police hold in
enforcing the ordinance. Notwithstanding that fact, the city
contends that the general order of the police department should
be considered a limiting construction of the ordinance, thus
curing its vagueness. However, the general police order does not
save the ordinance from being impermissibly vague.
We observe that lawmakers may not abdicate their
responsibilities for setting the standards of the criminal law.
Smith, 415 U.S. at 575, 39 L. Ed. 2d at 613, 94 S. Ct. at 1248.
It is the duty of the lawmakers to establish minimal guidelines
to govern law enforcement. Kolender, 461 U.S. at 358, 75 L.
Ed. 2d at 909, 103 S. Ct. at 1858. Moreover, although the
general police order goes to great lengths to define criminal
street gangs, it does absolutely nothing to cure the imprecisions
of- the definition of the "loitering" element of the crime. In
addition, a thorough examination of the record reveals that
police officers have not followed the guidelines of the general
order in a uniform manner.[fn 1]
Furthermore, the gang loitering ordinance is not reasonably
susceptible to a limiting construction which would affirm its
validity. Although the proscriptions of the ordinance are vague,
the city council's intent in its enactment is clear and
unambiguous. The city has declared gang members a public
■ menace and determined that gang members are too adept at
avoiding arrest for all the other crimes they commit.
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Accordingly, the city council crafted an exceptionally broad
ordinance which could be used to sweep these intolerable and
objectionable gang members from the city streets. As the
Supreme Court has observed, ordinances such as the gang
loitering ordinance are drafted in an intentionally vague manner
so that persons who are undesirable in the eyes of police and
prosecutors can be convicted even though they are not
chargeable with any other particular offense. Papachristou, 405
U.S. at 166, 31 L. Ed. 2d at 118, 92 S. Ct. at 845. Laws such as
these tend "to be invoked only where there is no other valid
basis for arresting an objectionable or suspicious person. The
opportunity for abuse *** is self-evident." Lewis, 415 U.S. at
136, 39 L. Ed. 2d at 221, 94 S. Ct. at 974 (Powell, J.,
concurring).
We empathize with the city council's objectives in enacting
the gang loitering ordinance. Criminal street gangs are an
expanding cancer in cur society and their illegal activities
endanger the safety of many law-abiding citizens. Nevertheless,
as important as it is to abate this problem, the city cannot fight
gang crime through the enactment and enforcement of an
ordinance that fails to meet constitutional standards for
definiteness and clarity. Kolender, 461 U.S. at 361, 75 L. Ed. 2d
at 911, 103 S. Ct. at 1860, citing Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306U.S. 451, 453, 83 L. Ed. 888, 890, 59 S, Ct. 618, 619 (1939).
II. Substantive Due Process
Defendants also contend that the gang loitering ordinance
is an arbitrary exercise of the city's police power and, thus,
violates substantive due process. The city responds that
defendants have no constitutional right to loiter. We agree with
defendants.
The city is incorrect in its contention that the gang loitering
ordinance intrudes upon no constitutionally protected activity. In
Papachristou, the Supreme Court reviewed a statute which
prohibited, among other things, the acts of loafing, loitering, and
nightwalking. The Court observed that, although not expressly
mentioned in the Constitution, such activities are amenities of
American life. Papachristou, 405 U.S. at 164, 31 L. Ed. 2d at
117, 92 S. Ct. at 844. The freedom to engage in such harmless
activities is an aspect of the personal liberties protected by the
due process clause. See City of Chicago v. Wilson, 75 Ill. 2d
525, 529-30 (1978), citing Kelley v. Johnson, 425 U.S. 238, 47
L. Ed. 2d 708, 96 S. Ct. 1440 (1976); see also Swank v. Smart,
898 F.2d 1247, 1251-52 (7th Cir. 1990).
Among those protected personal liberties which have long
been recognized are the general right to travel (see, e.g., Shapiro
V. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 629, 22 L. Ed. 2d 600, 612, 89 S.
Ct. 1322, 1329 (1969) (constitutional concepts of personal
liberty require that all citizens be free to travel throughout the
land uninhibited by laws which unreasonably burden or restrict
this movement), overruled in part on other grounds, Edelman
V. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 39 L. Ed. 2d 662, 94 S. Ct. 1347
(1974)), the right of locomotion (see, e.g., Anduha, 48 F.2d at
172, quoting Pinkerton v. Verberg, 78 Mich. 573, 584, 44 N.W.
579, 582 (1889) (the right to go where and when one pleases),
the right to freedom of movement (Kolender, 461 U.S. at 358,
75 L. Ed. 2d at 910, 103 S. Ct. at 1859), and the general right
to associate with others (Swank, 898 F.2d at 1252). The gang
loitering ordinance impedes upon all of these personal liberty
interests.
We recognize that such personal liberties are not absolute.
Only governmental actions which intrude upon personal liberties
■arbitrarily or in an utterly unreasonable manner violate the due
process clause. See Illinois Gamefowl Breeders Ass'n v. Block,
75 Ill. 2d 443, 453 (1979). Nevertheless, we find that the gang
loitering ordinance unreasonably infringes upon personal liberty.
Persons suspected of being in criminal street gangs are deprived
of the personal liberty of being able to freely walk the streets
and associate with friends, regardless of whether they are
actually gang members or have committed any crime. As one
trial judge warned one of defendants below, "[the police] will
lock you up just for being who you are." Such laws, arbitrarily
aimed at persons based merely on the suspicion that they may
commit some future crime, are arbitrary and likely to be
enforced in a discriminatory manner. See Papachristou, 405
U.S, at 166, 31 L. Ed. 2d at 118, 92 S. Ct. at 845.
The city is not helpless in its war against the criminal
activity of gangs. Many of the offensive activities the city
claims the gang loitering ordinance will deter are already
criminal acts. See, e.g., 720 ILCS 5/12—6 {West 1996)
(intimidation); 720 ILCS 5/12—6.1 (West 1996) (compelling
organization membership of persons); 720 ILCS 5/12—6.2 (West
1996) (aggravated intimidation—a gang member committing the
offense of intimidation for the purpose of furthering gang
activities); 720 ILCS 5/25—1 (West 1996) (mob action).
However, the city cannot empower the police to sweep
undesirable persons from the public streets through vague and
arbitrary criminal ordinances.
We hold the that the gang loitering ordinance is an arbitrary
restriction on personal liberty and, thus, violates substantive due
process. Therefore, we need not determine whether the gang
loitering ordinance impermissibly infringes on either the first
amendment right of expressive association or the fundamental
right of intimate association, both of which command a much
higher level of scrutiny. See, e.g., Roberts v. United States
Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 623, 82 L. Ed. 2d 462, 474-75, 104 S.
Ct. 3244, 3252-53 (1984).
For the foregoing reasons, the judgments of the appellate
court are affirmed.
Appellate court judgments affirmed.
[fnl] In one example, the general order provides that probable
cause of a defendant's membership in a criminal street gang can
be substantiated by his wearing distinctive colors indicative of
a specific criminal street gang. However, the general order
expressly states that gang "membership may not be established
solely because an individual is wearing clothing available for
sale to the general public." Chicago Police Department, General
Order No. 92—4, par. V (eff. August 8, 1992). Despite this
express limitation, defendant Morales was arrested and
convicted of violating the gang loitering ordinance even though
the arresting officer testified that his only basis for determining
that Morales was a gang member was that Morales wore black
and blue clothing, which are the colors of the Gangster Disciples
criminal street gang.
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